

233

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

VOLUME XXVII
November 1949 to May 1950

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SAINT LOUIS

ANDOVER-HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Editor: Robert J. Henle, S.J.

Managing Editor: Charles W. Mulligan, S.J.

Associate Editors

James A. McWilliams, S.J.

Vernon J. Bourke

James Collins

William L. Wade, S.J.

Thomas E. Davitt, S.J.

George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

Corresponding Editors

Belgium and France: Joseph de Finance, S.J., Vals, Le Puy en Velay,
Haute-Loire

Latin America: Dr. Oswaldo Robles, Mexico City

India: Pierre Fallon, S.J., Calcutta

The British Isles: The Reverend D. J. B. Hawkins, Esher, Surrey,
England

Business Manager: Bernard T. Schuerman, S.J.

Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published on the first of November, January, March, and May. The subscription price is \$3.00 a year. Single copies are \$0.75 each. The price for foreign subscriptions is \$3.20 a year.

Address all communications to:

The Editor or the Business Manager
THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN
St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Missouri

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. BY THE VON HOFFMANN PRESS, INC., SAINT LOUIS

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

THE NOTION OF ORDER ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

BRIAN COFFEY

PREFACE

This article and those which are to follow are based on a thesis, *De l'idée d'ordre d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin*, which the author prepared under the direction of F.-A. Blanche, O.P., starting in November, 1937, when Father Blanche was dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in the Institut Catholique de Paris. The thesis, which was completed towards the close of the year 1939, was not submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of *docteur-ès-philosophie* in the Université Catholique de Paris until June 26, 1947, owing to the insurmountable obstacles presented by the outbreak of war in 1939. For a variety of reasons the author was not able to use the time between 1939 and 1947 in order to perfect the text which had been completed in 1939.

In this English version of the results of his researches the author wishes to state that the original thesis, which it was found impossible to have printed because of the high cost of printing in England at the end of the war, was dedicated "to the memory of my father and to my mother." Furthermore, the original introduction contained expressions of gratitude to Father Blanche, who directed the research; to Canon D. Lallement, who examined the thesis and to whom the author owes his initiation into Thomistic thought; to M. Pierre Guerlet, minister of France in Ireland (1937) and to Professor R. Chauviré, professor of French at University College, Dublin, both of whom were instrumental in obtaining for the author the exchange studentships which permitted

DR. BRIAN COFFEY is assistant professor of philosophy at Saint Louis University. He holds a master of science degree from University College, Dublin, and a doctorate in philosophy from the Catholic University of Paris.

him to work in Paris; and lastly to Father C. Eysel  , at present dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in the Institut Catholique de Paris, who showed an extreme kindness to the author in all matters related to his "soutenance."

I

THE DEFINITION OF "ORDER" AND THE PRINCIPAL ACCEPTATIONS OF THE TERM ORDO IN THE LANGUAGE OF ST. THOMAS

It must always remain a source of regret to Thomists that St. Thomas did not find time to compose treatises on subjects such as analogy and participation, which must be understood thoroughly by whoever would obtain a firm grasp of Thomism. As of analogy and participation, so also of order. St. Thomas nowhere treats of order *ex professo*, although on occasion he indicates what the essential constituents are of order in general. This and later articles aim at following up these indications so as to disengage the Thomistic theory of order from a study of the relevant texts and to compare this theory with other theories of order which have been advanced by the philosophers of the West.

The initial difficulty to be overcome lies in the fact that St. Thomas puts the term *ordo*, of which the literal English translation is "order," to a multiplicity of uses. Not only does the term *ordo* form part of the purely philosophical vocabulary of St. Thomas, in which it carries a variety of meanings; it also forms part of his theological vocabulary, in which again it bears a variety of meanings. The study of order according to St. Thomas will begin therefore quite naturally with the determination of the definition of "order" and the distinction of the various acceptations of the term *ordo* in the language of St. Thomas.¹

¹ The present study follows the account of the acceptations of *ordo* given by F.-A. Blanche, O.P. in his article: "Les Mots significant la relation dans la langue de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue de Philosophie*, XXXII (July-August, 1925), 363-88. The references are to a reprint of this article published by Riv  re, Paris. The etymology of the word *ordo* is interesting. Following A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire   tymologique de la langue latine* (2nd ed.; Paris: Klincksieck, 1939), it is possible to advance the following: the word *ordo* was used at all times by the Latins and signified, in the common language, "rank" (abstract and concrete)—*tres ordines lapidum*; "alignment," "order"—*in ordinem, extra ordinem, ordine*. Later, the word took on, in the various technical languages, special acceptations, and particularly in the legal language in which *ordo* signifies the "class" to which a citizen belongs, the "rank"—*ordo senatorius*. In the military vocabulary it signified "post," "rank," "order of battle." Later, in virtue of expressions such as *centurio primi ordinis, ordines ducere*, it came to designate a "command"—*ordinem alicui dare*—and even the "one who exercises the command"—*tribunis militibus primisque ordinibus convocatis*. Etymologically, *ordo* would appear to be related to *ordior*. *Ordire* signified originally "to lay the warp," "to begin to weave," and then, by

So as to deal clearly with rather complex material, this article is divided into the following parts: (a) the definition of "order" and the proper sense of *ordo*; (b) *ordo* as "destination"; (c) *ordo* as "relation"; (d) *ordo* as "rank"; and (e) the theological acceptations of *ordo*.

A

THE DEFINITION OF "ORDER" AND THE PROPER SENSE OF *ORDO*

What does the term *ordo* signify, first and foremost, in the vocabulary of St. Thomas? The answer to this question may be found by considering the following text:

extension, "to begin," "to undertake." Every profession and every craft provides examples of such extensions of the sense of a word. The special meaning of "to weave" would appear to have been the primitive sense. Note that the Latins did not advert to a relationship between *ordo* and *ordior*; "however, a relationship between *ordo*, ("order," "rank"), and *ordior* is possible" (*loc. cit.*, p. 711). If this is so, then the primitive meaning of *ordo* would be "the order of the threads in the web," i.e., concrete order. *Ordo* would have come to signify abstract order later. All this, however, is conjectural.

It would be natural to attempt to trace back the etymology of *ordo* to the Sanskrit, in which language the word *rta*, with its diverse meanings of "sacrifice," "natural order," and "moral order," is so important. A relation between the Latin *artus* ("articulation") and *rta* is possible. Unfortunately, it does not appear to be possible to relate *artus* and *ordo*, as Mr. Brough, Sanskritist at the British Museum, pointed out to the author in a letter. It can be said, however, that there is much of value to be gained from a study of Vedic notions of order (see A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads* [Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1926]), as also of Chinese, and particularly of Confucian, ideas of order (see Granet, *La Pensée chinoise* [Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1934], as also the most recent edition of Bréhier's *History*, etc.). There is much scope for the application of the methods of comparative philosophy in the study of those theories of order which have developed outside of the Western tradition.

The bibliography, as far as the Thomistic theory of order is concerned, is not rich. We have found the following books and articles:

- a) F.-A. Blanche, O.P., "La Notion de l'analogie dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Rev. de Phil.*, April, 1921; "Les Mots signifiant la relation dans la langue de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *ibid.*, XXXII (July-August, 1925), 363-88; "Une théorie de l'analogie," *ibid.*, III (New Series, Jan.-Feb., 1932), 37-78. These three articles include remarks which are essential for the understanding of Thomistic texts on order.
- b) A. Chollet, *La Notion de l'ordre* (Paris, Lethielleux). This is a study of the Thomistic notion of order, including a chapter on the notion of order as such, followed by an account of the parallelism between the orders of being, the good, and the true.
- c) Joseph M. Marling, C.P.P.S., *The Order of Nature* (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1934). This doctorate thesis includes a chapter on the metaphysics of order, but is principally concerned with the study of the Aristotelico-Thomistic accounts of the order of nature and the examination of modern theories of natural order. A very useful work. The analysis of the notion of order goes beyond that given in Abbé Chollet's work. Neither of these works treats of the questions of vocabulary, which are the subject matter of our article; nor do they treat of such important questions as that of the analogousness of the notion of order.

The terms *before* and *after* are attributed according to the relation to some principle. Now order includes some mode of the *before* and *after*. Hence, wherever there is a principle, it is necessary that there be also an order of some kind.²

The study of this text will enable us to determine both the material and the formal aspects of order.

The material aspect of order. Since anteriority and posteriority are relations which require, in order to exist, a plurality of terms (at least two), order implies, materially, a plurality of members (at least two), as St. Thomas insinuates in another text, anterior in date³ to the one cited above: "Order also includes distinction, because there is no order except of things which are distinct. But this is presupposed rather than signified by the name of order."⁴

d) Cardinal D. Mercier, *Métaphysique générale* (7th ed.; Paris: Alcan, 1923). An account of the notion of order is given on pp. 735 ff.

e) A. Forest, *La Structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas* (Paris: Vrin, 1931). Beginning on p. 285 there is a chapter on the unity of order, in which, after describing very briefly the notion of order as such, the author considers the accounts of the order of the universe which are found in the works of a number of medieval theologians. The main emphasis is, of course, placed on the Thomistic theory.

f) Sir Henry Slessor, *Order and Disorder* (London: Hutchinson, 1945). The author, who is a well-known student of legal questions, studies the stages by which the Europeans have passed from the concrete social order of the thirteenth century to the actual confusion. It is unfortunate that the author, who has taken pains to inform himself on matters related to the history of medieval philosophy, does not study the notion of order as such. Furthermore, the work is marred by inexact views of such matters as the Thomistic proofs of the existence of God. The author is an Anglican intellectual.

g) R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *Le Réalisme et le principe de finalité* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1931). This work is of great value in the study of the order of finality.

h) E. A. Pace, "The Concept of Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism*, II (1928), 51-72. The ideas of this author are examined particularly in a forthcoming article on "The *Ratio Ordinis*."

i) A. Silva-Tarouca, "L'idée d'ordre dans la philosophie de saint Thomas," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XL (1937), 341-84. The ideas of this author will be examined in a later article.

j) ———. *Thomas Heute* (Vien: Verlag Herder, 1947). We shall give an account of this work, which we have seen only recently, in a later article.

² "Prius et posterius dicitur secundum relationem ad aliquod principium. Ordo autem includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris. Unde oportet quod ubicunque est aliquod principium, sit etiam aliquis ordo" (*ST*, II-II. 26. 1).

³ The commentary *In IV Libros Sententiarum* was composed by St. Thomas in the years 1254-56; the *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae* dates from 1271-72, according to P. Mandonnet, O.P. (*Bibliographie Thomiste* [Kain, Belgium: Le Saulchoir, 1921], p. xv).

⁴ "Includit etiam (ordo) distinctionem, quia non est ordo, nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet" (*In I Sent.*, 20. 1. 3. 1). Without distinction order is unimaginable, *etiam si figendi datur licentia*,

The formal aspect of order, 1. Formally, order requires the disposition of the members of some plurality according to anteriority and posteriority. That the anteriority and posteriority envisaged in the text are not solely temporal modes of relationship is clear both from the reference to *aliquem modum prioris et posterioris* and from the explicit content of another text:

. . . the notion of order includes the notion of the prior and the posterior. Thus there can be said to be an order of things according to all those modes, spatial, temporal, and all like others, according to which a thing can be said to be before another.⁵

The formal dependence of order on the presence of relations of anteriority and posteriority is exemplified in the manner in which St. Thomas compares the grace which a man possesses before losing it through sin, to the evening light, and the grace which a man receives after doing penance, to the morning light. These two graces are not to be compared, he says,⁶ according to a similitude to the greater and less in quantity. They are to be compared according to a similitude of order (*similitudo ordinis*), for the reason that the night follows upon, is posterior to, the light of evening, while the morning light is followed by, is anterior to, the full light of day.

The formal aspect of order, 2. Formally, *primarily*, order requires a principle, which will be the source of the relations of anteriority and posteriority according to which the members of the plurality of order are disposed. Of two things situated at different degrees, one comes before the other, is *prius*, and the other comes after, is *posterius*, either because each one is differently related to some one common term or because, of the two things under consideration, one is itself the first. As St. Thomas says, ". . . a thing is said to be before another, either because it has the nature of some principle or because it is nearer to the principle."⁷ Thus, for example, marbles arranged in a row form an order which is determined by the disposition of the marbles one after the other, starting from the first.

The principle, in virtue of which are determined the relations of anteriority and posteriority which hold for the members of a given

according to the expression of Cajetan, in *Commentarium in De Ente et Essentia*. Proem. (Turin: Marietti, 1934), p. 10.

⁵ ". . . ordo in ratione sua includit . . . rationem prioris et posterioris: unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur, secundum locum, et secundum tempus, et secundum omnia hujusmodi" (*In I Sent.*, 20. 1. 3. 1).

⁶ See *ST*, III. 89. 2 ad 3.

⁷ ". . . prius dicitur aliquid, vel secundum rationem alicujus principii vel quia principio propinquius est" (*De Virtut.*, de *Spe*, 3).

plurality, is thus the most formal element of order. It is this formal superiority of the principle among the constituents of order which explains the peculiar turn given by St. Thomas to the final sentence of our initial text, "Wherever there is a principle, it is necessary that there be also an order of some kind." What follows in strict logic, from the first two propositions of the text referred to, is that wherever there is an order there must be a principle, for the reason that all order includes relations of anteriority and posteriority, and these relations are determined with reference to a principle. According to Cajetan,⁸ order is the effect of a principle in act. Since the notion of principle is analogical, because principles are diverse, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to define *principle*. But it can be described; and in a number of places⁹ St. Thomas notes that the principle is that out of which (*ex quo*) something begins, or that from which (*a quo*) something proceeds. The principle is the beginning, the starting point, of a thing, as the keel is the beginning of the ship; and the notion of principle includes neither the idea of any causal communication of being, nor even the idea of some superiority beyond that of being a mere first. The principle which is in act declares its priority to that (*principiatum*) which proceeds or begins from it. But if the principle is not, then the order is not either; for there exists no determinant of the disposition of the members of the plurality. So that, according to one description which St. Thomas offers of the principle, ". . . one calls principle what is first in some order."¹⁰ St. Thomas, therefore, expresses himself in the manner to which we have referred above, in order to stress the primordial importance of the principle in the formal structure of order. Instead of inferring the cause from the effect, and concluding from the first two propositions of the text under consideration that wherever there is an order there is a principle, he leaves this proper inference to be understood, and asserts the dependence of the effect upon the cause (as Cajetan puts it), or rather of the *principiatum* on the principle which is in act.

Considered then, in all generality, the notion of order is that of a plurality of things (or of objects, since mental constructs can be disposed in order) disposed according to anteriority and posteriority in virtue of some first or principle. As such, order is *gradation*, and the primary sense of *ordo* is gradation. The role of the principle consists uniquely in assigning their places in the gradation to other things or

⁸ See Cajetan, *In II-II Summae Theologiae*, 26. 1.

⁹ "Dicitur principium ex quo incipit aliquid" (*In I Sent.*, 12. 2 ad 1). "Illud a quo est aliquid" (*Ibid.*, 29. 1 ad 1). "Id a quo aliquid procedit" (*ST*, I. 33. 1).

¹⁰ ". . . principium dicitur quod est primum in aliquo ordine" (*In V Metaphys.*, lect. 1, ed. Cathala, no. 75).

objects, in a spatial gradation to other bodies, in a temporal gradation (series) to other instants. The example favored by St. Thomas is that of the stones ordered in place by chance (*a casu*); “. . . of the stones heaped up one on another the topmost is first in one order, and in another order the lowermost is first.”¹¹

The various elements which St. Thomas distinguishes in the notion of order may therefore be assembled in the following description: *order is the arrangement of a plurality of things or objects according to anteriority and posteriority in virtue of a principle*. It might be said that the phrase “in virtue of a principle” is stronger than is necessary, since this phrase might appear to imply some causal action of the principle upon the things which are disposed in relation to it, and we have already pointed out that the notion of principle does not include any notion whatever of causal influence. An objection of this kind would not be unreasonable, and could, of course, be met at once by a rephrasing in weaker form of the description of order which we have offered. Nevertheless, in view of the primordial importance of the principle in the structure of order—and in conformity, as we believe, with the intention of St. Thomas—we think it preferable to retain the questioned phrase. Later consideration of the *ratio ordinis* will provide further support for this choice.¹²

¹¹ “. . . sicut in lapidibus superpositis invicem in acervo, supremus est prior in uno ordine, et alio est prior infimus” (*In V Metaphys.*, lect. 13, ed. Cathala, no. 939).

¹² Cardinal Mercier, (*Métaphysique générale* [7th ed.; Paris: Alcan, 1923]) gives two definitions of order which he attributes to St. Thomas: *ordo nihil aliud dicit quam rationem prioris et posterioris sub aliquo principio*, and (order is) *recta ratio rerum in finem* (see pp. 536-37). The second of these definitions is also given by P. Coffey, (*Ontology* [London: Longmans, 1929]). The references to the works of St. Thomas given by these authors are not exact, nor have we been able to discover these precise texts in the works of St. Thomas.

R. Eisler, (*Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* [4th ed.; Berlin, 1929]), under *Ordnung*, attributes the following definition of order to St. Thomas: “nach Thomas ist *ordo determinata relatio partium ad invicem* (*In XI Metaphys.*, lect. 12, ed. Cathala, no. 2377). What is written at the place indicated is: “*Positio vero non addit supra Ubi, nisi ordinem partium determinatum, quae nihil est quam determinata relatio partium ad invicem.*” It is clear that it is question not precisely of order, but of the predicamental *situs*, in which a certain order, the order of parts, is implied.

The most amusing definition of order which we have found is in the *Petit Larousse illustré*, under *ordre*: “Disposition méthodique des choses régulièrement classées.” The reader who will look up the meanings of the terms employed in this definition as they are given in the same dictionary will have quite an amusing time. There is a valuable study to be made of the manner in which the more popular dictionaries define the words which signify the more fundamental notions which men have conceived.

B

ORDO AS "DESTINATION"

The principle of order is not always a simple first, the role of which is limited to the assigning of rank in a gradation to members of a plurality. The principle may be a cause. Now, while the notion of principle implies, as it were reciprocally, the notion of order, the notion of cause implies also that of communication of being. The notion of cause is thus less general than that of principle. Every cause is a principle, but every principle is not a cause. The principle which is a cause attains to the very nature of the members of an order; they are in dependence on it and do not exist without it. In this case the order is more stable, penetrating as it does to the nature of the ordered things. All the causes are principles of order.

... in the order of nature a thing is said to be prior through a comparison with the principles of nature, which are the four causes. Thus, in each genus of cause, the prior in the order of nature is that which is nearer to the cause.¹³

It is with reference to the orders of which the final cause is the principle that *ordo* takes on a new meaning. It then expresses the relation of a thing to its end, the *destination* of the thing.¹⁴ St. Thomas writes, for instance, "... of the destination of creatures to God himself, as to their end."¹⁵ According to another text, "... it is doubtless permitted to sell temporal things, but their destination to spiritual things should not be the object of a sale."¹⁶ Again, "... law, properly speaking, must regard the destination to the common happiness."¹⁷

Destination is order, but it is not order in general. Those who on occasion treat of order according to St. Thomas as if order for him always implies finality, take a far too restricted view of the matter; they forget the example of the stones ordered in a heap by chance, *a casu*. Destination is order of a high type, the order in which a final cause is principle. St. Thomas is always careful to distinguish this order from inferior types of order:

¹³ "... in ordine naturae dicitur aliquid esse prius per comparisonem ad naturae principia, quae sunt quattuor causae. Unde secundum unumquodque genus causae prius in ordine naturae est quod propinquius est causae" (*Quodlibet.*, 5. 19). For the analysis of the notions of principle and cause, consult *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 1 and 2.

¹⁴ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁵ "... de ordine creaturarum in ipsum [Deum] sicut in finem" (*CG*, I. 9).

¹⁶ "... ipsa quidem temporalia vendere licet: sed ordo eorum ad spiritualia sub venditione cadere non debet" (*ST*, II-II, 100. 4 ad 1).

¹⁷ "... necesse est quod lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem" (*ST*, I-II, 90. 2).

Two kinds of order are found in things. One is the mutual order of the parts of some whole or of some multitude, like the mutual order of the parts of a house. The other is the destination of things to their end. And this order is higher than the first. For, as the Philosopher teaches, the order (co-ordination) of the parts of the army is on account of the destination of the whole army to the general.¹⁸

C
ORDO AS "RELATION"

Very often in the texts of St. Thomas *ordo* bears the meaning of "relation." This is not surprising in view of the fact that anteriority and posteriority, which enter into the formal aspect of order, are relations.

As is well known, St. Thomas uses a rich vocabulary to express the relative aspects of reality. Of these terms,

some have for unique function [at least as technical terms] to signify relation, the others originally had other significations, which they retain in part in the Thomistic vocabulary, and the signification of relation was added on.¹⁹

In the first group are the terms *ad aliquid*, *respectus*, and *relatio*; in the second group are the terms *habitus*, *comparatio*, *proportio*, *ratio*, *intentio*, and *attribuere*.

Ordo also finds a place among the terms of the second group, as witness its use as a synonym for *relatio*:

. . . that relation, which is nothing but the regard [order] of one creature to another, comports itself in one way so far as it is an accident and in another way so far as it is a relation or regard [order].²⁰

An argument accepted by St. Thomas places order under relation: ". . . order is a sort of relation."²¹ But when it is necessary to be

¹⁸ "Invenitur enim duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicujus totius seu alicujus multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ordinantur. Alius est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut Philosophus docet in undecimo Metaphysicorum [lect. 12, no. 2629-31], ordo partium exercitus est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem" (*In I Eth.*, lect. 1, ed. Pirotta, no. 1).

¹⁹ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, p. 4. We have drawn largely upon this account of the terms signifying relation in St. Thomas's works, for the reasons that the conclusions therein expressed are sound and that recent students of the Thomistic notion of order have overlooked Father Blanche's work, and because, as we have indicated, it is necessary to begin the study of order according to St. Thomas by determining the acceptations of *ordo*.

²⁰ ". . . ipsa relatio quae nihil est aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad aliam, aliud se habet in quantum est accidens, et aliud in quantum est relatio vel ordo" (*De Pot.*, 7. 9 ad 7).

²¹ ". . . ordo relatio quaedam est" (*De Ver.*, 27. 4 sed contra 4).

exact, St. Thomas is careful to oppose order to relation: "... there will not be an order between white and musician, but they will sustain, the one to the other, a convertible relation,"²² i.e., a relation of the same kind in both directions, as, for instance, a relation of equality or similitude. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish those uses of *ordo* in which what is properly signified is either order or destination—and consequently, implicitly, relations of anteriority and posteriority—and those uses of *ordo* in which the term stands for, is a synonym for, "relation."

The difficulties do not end at this point. Sometimes, as we shall see, St. Thomas uses *ordo* to designate a predicamental relation; sometimes he uses the term to designate a relation of reason; and sometimes he uses it to designate a transcendental relation (*relatio secundum dici*).

The use of *ordo* to designate a predicamental relation is far from an arbitrary imposition of the meaning of a term, since St. Thomas proves the existence of predicamental relations from the existence of order in the world, in a well-known text from which we abstract the following passage:

... the perfection and the good which are in extramental things are not considered only with reference to something inhering absolutely in things, but they are also considered according to the order of one thing to another, just as the good of the army consists in the order of the parts of the army, to which order the Philosopher compares the order of the universe. There must therefore be some order among things themselves. Now this order is a sort of relation. Thus there must be some relations between things themselves, according as one thing is ordered to another. ... And thus therefore those things which are ordered to another must be really related to it, and in them there is something which is relation.²³

It is not necessary to comment here on the doctrine set forth in this complex text. It is sufficient for our present purpose to note the way in which St. Thomas approaches *ordo* to *relatio*, thus providing a

²² "... non erit ordo inter album et musicum, sed e converso respicient se adinvicem" (*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 7, ed. Cathala, no. 633).

²³ "... perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit; huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus ordinem universi. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quod una ad alteram ordinantur ... et sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid realiter referentur ad ipsum, et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio" (*De Pot.*, 7. 9).

basis for the use of *ordo* as a synonym for *relatio* (as designating the predicamental relation) in the text which we considered at the beginning of this section.²⁴

Not every predicamental relation, however, is a formal relation of order. It is clear that the real predicamental relations of equality and similitude include, of themselves, neither anteriority nor posteriority. St. Thomas opposes relations which are of the same kind in both directions, like equality or similitude (*relationes aequiparentiae*, "relations of parity"), to relations which are not of the same kind in each direction (*relatio superpositionis*, "relation of superiority"; *relatio suppositionis*, "relation of inferiority"). ". . . tutorship implies a relation of superiority, just as *master* does."²⁵

. . . such a relation [it is question of a relation conceived as going from the Creator to the creature] cannot be real, as Avicenna declares. But the relation goes from the creature to the Creator, and is therefore a relation of inferiority.²⁶

Relations of the kind indicated in the above cited texts imply anteriority and posteriority. The master is superior to, therefore anterior to, the pupil; the creature is inferior to, therefore posterior to, the Creator.

There are also predicamental relations which do not admit of an order according to the before and after. These are the relations called *relationes aequiparentiae*.

This is not necessary in relative things [i.e., the essential imperfection which is always verified of one of the opposites in oppositions of contradiction, of contrariety and of privation]; and each of the relative things can be considered as perfect, as it appears with maximum clarity in the case of relatives by parity, for example in relations of equality, and similarity.²⁷

To advance further in the study of St. Thomas's use of *ordo* for "relation," it will be necessary to consider briefly the nature of relation. As is well known, the essence of relation consists in a sort of regard towards something else. "What are called relations signify, properly,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 7.

²⁵ ". . . magisterium importat relationem superpositionis, sicut dominus" (*De Ver.*, 11. 2 sed contra 2).

²⁶ ". . . talis relatio non potest esse realis, ut Avicenna dicit, sed est entis creati ad Creatorem, unde patet quod est relatio suppositionis" (*De Pot.*, 3. 3 ad 5).

²⁷ "Hoc autem in relativis non oportet, immo utrumque considerari ut perfectum, sicut patet maxime in relativis aequiparentiae . . . ut aequale, simile" (*De Pot.*, 7. 8 ad 4).

only a regard to another.”²⁸ It is precisely because the relation, from the point of view of its essence, is nothing but a sort of regard, or manner of being *towards* another, that it alone, among the categories, does not imply, essentially, reality. The relation, being essentially *ad aliquid*, as such neither affects the subject from which it emanates nor the object to which it turns. Its reality derives from its foundation in a real subject. When it is not the mind which considers the relative aspect of one thing to another, when the mind does not *make* the relation, but when, in the subject, there is a real cause of the regard which constitutes the relation, then the relation is real. Even in this case, the relation is a reality modifying the subject only so far as it is an accident, from the point of view of its *esse in*, but not at all from the point of view of its *esse ad*. Thus the proper essence of relation will be found as perfectly in the relation of reason as in the real relation. While the category of relation includes only real relations, from the point of view of the concept, the notion of relation as applied to real relations and to relations of reason will be univocal, so long as it is a matter of pure relations (*relationes secundum esse*). There will only be analogy, improperly speaking, as regards predicamental relations and relations of reason, from the point of view of existence—the analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem* mentioned by St. Thomas.²⁹ But the concept of relation becomes properly analogical when it comprises both pure relations and relations by denomination (*relationes secundum dici*), of which the first mentioned express only the regard which is the essence of relation while the others express something absolute of itself, but which is the principle of a relation.³⁰

Now, St. Thomas employs the terms *ad aliquid*, *relatio*, *respectus* to designate pure relations, whether real or of reason, as is clear from the following group of texts. “. . . there are certain relations which are nothing in reality but which have being only in the reason.”³¹ “There are some relations which are not real, but are of reason only.”³² “It happens that the relation really is in the one, and not in the other.”³³

Of the three terms mentioned in the last paragraph, the term *relatio* is used to express the full amplitude of the notion of relation, as

²⁸ “Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud” (*ST*, I. 28. 1).

²⁹ *In I Sent.*, 19. 5. 2 ad 1.

³⁰ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, pp. 4-6.

³¹ “. . . inveniuntur quaedam ad aliquid quae nihil sunt in rerum naturae sed in ratione tantum” (*Quodlibet.*, 9. 4).

³² “Inveniuntur quidam respectus qui non sunt reales sed rationales tantum” (*Quodlibet.*, 1. 2).

³³ “Contingit quod relatio realiter est in uno et non in altero” (*In I Sent.*, 26. 2. 1).

comprising both pure relations and relations by denomination. "Those relations are not only relations in so far as their denomination indicates a regard to something else, but they are also relations of which the regard is the essence."³⁴ The term *relativum* has the same extension as *relatio*³⁵ and is more often used by St. Thomas in treating of the division of relation into pure relations and relations by denomination.

. . . it must be understood that there are two sorts of relation. One is the relation in itself [i.e., the pure relation; the term *absoluta* signifies that this relation is relation in its essence, as opposed to the relation by denomination, which is relation *secundum quid*] . . . but there are other relatives which imply at once the relation and the foundation of this relation.³⁶

The term *respectus*—which, like the terms *ad aliquid* and *relatio*, expresses the pure relation—is opposed to *relatio* when it is necessary to distinguish in a real relation what belongs to it as a real accident and what belongs to it formally as relation.³⁷

The term *habitus* is used in many instances to designate a relation of reason as opposed to a real relation. The Aristotelian conception of the essence of relation as a certain manner of being in respect to something else is expressed in the formula $\pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \tau\iota\ \pi\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$, which St. Thomas translates *ad aliud quodammodo se habere*.³⁸ *Habitus* expresses, therefore, like *respectus*, relation in its essence, and can be used to signify a relation of reason, in opposition to *relatio*, used to designate the real relation.

. . . in the animal, these relations [of right and left] are real, since founded on the diverse energies of the determined parts. But in other things they are found only with the character of an attitude of one thing towards another and so they are called relations of reason.³⁹

³⁴ ". . . relationes istae non sunt tantum secundum dici ad aliquid, sed etiam secundum esse" (*In I Sent.*, 33. 1. 1 ad 1).

³⁵ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, pp. 6-7. *Relatio* and *relativum* can both designate any kind of relation. The difference between them is that while *relatio* expresses the relation as such, *relativum* expresses the subject in so far as affected by a relation: ". . . relationem significat (persona) non ut relationem, sed ut relativum, id est, ut significatur hoc nomine Pater, non ut significatur hoc nomine paternitas" (*De Pot.*, 9. 4). Also *relativum* designates at times the thing, at times the word: as designating the thing—"In relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non existente: sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia" (*ST*, I. 13. 7 obj. 6); as designating the word—" . . . relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas" (*ST*, I. 13. 7 ad 1).

³⁶ ". . . intelligendum est quod duplex est relatio. Quaedam est relatio absoluta . . . quaedam autem relativa sunt quae simul important relationem et fundamentum relationis" (*In II Sent.*, 1. 1. 5 ad 8).

³⁷ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁹ ". . . in animali istae relationes [dextrum et sinistrum] realiter sunt, quia

Now *ordo* is used by St. Thomas as a synonym both of *respectus* and *habitus*.

. . . those things which are attributed to God and to other things are attributed neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is to say, by a respect or relation to some unique term.⁴⁰

. . . since a relation requires two extremes, there are three conditions which make a relation to be real or of reason. Sometimes from both extremes it is something of reason only, as when a regard or relation can be between things only in the apprehension of the reason, as when we say that *the same is to itself the same*.⁴¹

It follows from the usage of the above cited texts that *ordo* designates on occasion the predicamental relation, on occasion the relation of reason. As St. Thomas puts it, "as the real relation consists in the regard of thing to thing, so the relation of reason consists in the regard of concepts."⁴²

It should always be remembered, however, that the language of St. Thomas is a marvelously supple instrument for the expression of shades of meaning. St. Thomas is master of the words which he uses to express the reality which he thinks. Thus he writes, ". . . natural things sustain together a natural order and correspondence."⁴³ Here *ordo* designates the order of nature, a concrete order; and *habitus*, which could possibly be translated by the word "relation," designates, much more probably, the aspect of reality according to which things are adapted one to the other in a coexistence. At the least, when *ordo* and *habitus* occur together in the one phrase, that does not necessarily imply that both, or either one, expresses relation as such.

There is one further aspect of the use of *ordo* by St. Thomas which remains to be considered in this place. The proper essence of relation is found as perfectly in the relation of reason as in the relation which

fundantur in diversis virtutibus determinatarum partium; sed in aliis non sunt nisi secundum rationem habitudinis unius ad alterum et ideo dicuntur relationes rationis" (*In I Sent.*, 26. 2. 1).

⁴⁰ ". . . ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur praedicantur neque univoce, neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquod unum" (*CG*, I. 34).

⁴¹ ". . . cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum: quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem" (*ST*, I. 13. 7).

⁴² ". . . sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum" (*De Pot.*, 7. 11).

⁴³ ". . . ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem" (*ST*, I. 13. 7).

is real, provided only that this real relation is a pure relation *secundum esse*. But the terms "real relation" and "predicamental relation" are not equivalent. "This distinction between pure relatives and relatives by denomination implies nothing as regards what concerns the reality of the relation."⁴⁴ There are pure relations which are not real, as the right or the left in a pillar; and there are real relations by denomination, as when we say that potency is *ad actum*. "Potency is thus named because of its relation to act."⁴⁵ The expression *relatio secundum dici* signifies literally "relative inasmuch as it is denominated." Following the indication of St. Thomas that ". . . all the things that are denominated according to their relation to something else are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they relate,"⁴⁶ it is possible to define the relation *secundum dici* as relative insofar as denominated by a regard to something else (*relativum secundum dici in ordine ad aliud*).⁴⁷

Now St. Thomas, who uses *ordo* as a synonym for *relatio*—the term which expresses the full extension of the analogical notion of relation—often uses *ordo* where what is denoted is some reality that is non-relative of itself, but is the principle or origin of a relation; *ordo* then stands for a relation *secundum dici*. ". . . the human body has a natural relation to the rational soul."⁴⁸ It is true that this text might be translated in another manner; we might write, "The human body has a natural destination to the rational soul." But it is not necessary to inquire, at this point, into the ultimate foundations of the relations *secundum dici* and their connections with finality. It is sufficient to have made the point about the extension of the term *ordo* as a synonym for relation. Nor is it necessary, at this point, to ask why St. Thomas was led to use *ordo* with such a wide diversity of relative meaning.⁴⁹ That question, too, will be treated in a later paper. Enough

⁴⁴ ". . . distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis" (*De Pot.*, 7. 10 ad 11).

⁴⁵ ". . . potentia . . . dicitur ad actum" (*De An.*, 1. 13).

⁴⁶ ". . . omnia . . . quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur" (*ST*, I-II. 54. 2).

⁴⁷ See Blanche, *loc. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴⁸ ". . . corpus humanum habet naturalem ordinem ad animam rationalem" (*ST*, III. 8. 2).

⁴⁹ Note, in this context, the manner in which St. Thomas associates *ordo* with *proportio*: "Voluntas duplicem habitudinem habet ad volitum. Unam quidem secundum quod est quodammodo in volente per quamdam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum" (*ST*, I-II. 16. 4). In another text we find: ". . . ordo proportio quaedam est" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 3, no. 3). Now St. Thomas uses *proportio* with the sense of relation: "Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur" (*ST*, I. 12. 1 ad 4). In the following text *proportio* designates that aspect of co-adaptation between realities which is involved in the transcendental relation between them: "Proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno

has been said to make it clear that the exact understanding of Thomistic texts cannot be attained without careful attention to the various shades of meaning which a single term, such as *ordo*, can carry. The term *ratio*, of which we shall have to speak in treating of the *ratio ordinis*, is perhaps the flagrant example of the many meanings a word can have in the Thomistic vocabulary. Here it is worth noting that the following text is sometimes misconstrued: *Ad hoc quod aliqua habent ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia ejusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.*⁵⁰ Authors sometimes interpret this text in the sense of a determination of the essential conditions of order.⁵¹ Yet, in the passage from which the text is taken, St. Thomas must be using *ordo* with the meaning of "relation," since he there determines the conditions of the predicamental relation. Furthermore, if the text referred formally to order, then it would follow that there could be order only in the extramental reality (note the *oportet quod utrumque sit ens*); but, as we shall see, order extends also to the being of reason. The text should therefore be translated,

In order that things be related really one to another, it is necessary that each be a real being, and that each be distinct (since there is no real relation of a thing to itself), and that each be referable to the other (see n. 50).

D

ORDO AS "RANK"

Ordo is sometimes used by St. Thomas to signify the rank, or degree. "One attributes to God and to creatures nothing which is at the same

modo idem est proportio quod certitudo mensurationis durarum quantitatum . . . alio modo dicitur proportio habitudo ordinis, sicut dicimus esse proportionem inter materiam et formam, quia se habet in ordine, ut perficiatur materia per formam et hoc secundum proportionabilitatem quamdam, quia sicut forma potest dare esse, ita et materia potest recipere idem esse" (*In III Sent.*, 1. 1. 1 ad 3). The above-mentioned text from the *Physics* must not be taken as a definition of order; the context from which it is taken makes it quite clear that St. Thomas is thinking not of the essence of order, but of a necessary condition of order. He writes: "Sed manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis, nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt, potest esse absque ordine [destination], quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem, non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium. Sed duo infinita non habent ordinem ad invicem, quia infiniti ad infinitum nulla est proportio: omnis autem ordo proportio quaedam est" (*loc. cit.*). There is no order if there is lacking a proportion or co-adaptation of the ordered terms one to the other.

There is another use of *ordo* which calls for mention. St. Thomas uses the term to designate not precisely the relations of anteriority and posteriority which a principle determines, but the foundation, in the order of quantity, of these relations. He writes: "De ratione quantitatis est ordo partium" (*ST*, I. 14. 12 ad 11).

⁵⁰ *De Pot.*, 7. 2.

degree, but the attribution is made according to anteriority and posteriority, since whatever is predicated of God is predicated essentially."⁵²

It should be noted, however, that the locution *eodem ordine* should not be taken materially, as always meaning "at the same rank" (or "degree," or "level"). When comparing the methods of theology and philosophy, St. Thomas remarks, "The two doctrines do not follow the same order of procedure."⁵³ The meaning is that, in treating of their respective objects, theology and philosophy follow paths which are directionally opposed one to the other. The philosopher considers in creatures what attaches to them in their proper nature and thence rises to the First Cause known rationally by demonstrated knowledge; the theologian considers God first of all, and as known by revelation, and creatures only afterwards, and then in their relation to God. We are therefore here in presence of a use of *ordo* directly related to its proper sense.

E THEOLOGICAL ACCEPTATIONS OF *ORDO*

It is merely required here to indicate that the use of the term *ordo* in texts which treat of holy orders and of the Blessed Trinity is a purely theological use of the term, the consideration of which lies outside a philosophical thesis. The analogical transference of the notion of order so as to show that there can not be confusion in the plurality of the Divine Persons, for example, concerns the theologian.⁵⁴ But the

⁵¹ Thus, Marling, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.

⁵² "Nihil autem de Deo et de rebus aliis praedicatur eodem ordine, sed secundum prius et posterius: cum de Deo omnia praedicentur essentialiter" (*CG*, I. 32).

⁵³ "Exinde . . . est quod non eodem ordine utraque doctrina procedit" (*CG*, II. 4).

⁵⁴ For a good treatment of the theological use of *ordo* in the *Treatise of the Trinity* see M. T.-L. Penido, *Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris: Vrin, 1931), pp. 260-62.

For a determination of the senses of *ordo* in relation to the sacrament of holy orders, see B. H. Merkelbach, O. P., *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (3rd ed.; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939), III, 687-88.

Additional note: The verb *ordinare* can have meanings corresponding to those which we have distinguished in the case of *ordo*.

Thus we find: the sense of "to arrange," "to order": "sic nihil potest fieri contra cursum naturae quia ex necessitate harum causarum corporalium ordinatur" (*De Pot.*, 6. 1); the sense of "to be destined to," "to have for end": "contemplativa vita praecipue ordinatur ad Dei contemplationem" (*ST*, II-II. 180. 2 ad 2); and the sense of "to put in relation to," "to establish a relation between": "Quando . . . accipit intellectus aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, in quantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud" (*De Pot.*, 7. 11). Also, *ordinare* and *ordinari* constructed with *ad* can have the three senses indicated. See *ST*, II-II. 58. 7 obj. 2, 9 et ad 3, in which texts the terms referred to have successively the three senses indicated.

philosopher should remember that such uses of the term *ordo* do occur in St. Thomas's works, and that in this case also *ordo* bears a variety of meanings.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the description of order in general has been determined, and the principal acceptations of *ordo* as "gradation," "destination," "relation," and "rank," have been distinguished. The problem which arises next, in this study, is that of the distinction of the diverse orders of which St. Thomas treats. The formal entry into this matter is by way of a consideration of what St. Thomas calls, in a term which has proved extremely difficult to translate into English, the *ratio ordinis*. The next article in this series will therefore be entitled "The *Ratio Ordinis*."

DHARMA AND NATURAL LAW— A COMPARATIVE STUDY

MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND

Modern exponents of Indian philosophy have made great claims for India's historical systems of thought, the cumulative development of which has taken some three thousand years; and, truly, the intellectual product of those many centuries is amazing in its complexity, depth, and subtlety. Yet until recently the popular impression in the West has been that Indian political and ethical thought as such is either non-existent or else wrapped in vague, misty speculation—an impression nurtured by the uncritical statements of commentators like Willoughby and Dunning,¹ who obviously had made no detailed study of the subject and apparently took their cue from an often-quoted but misleading remark of Max Müller, the famous Sanskrit scholar of the late nineteenth century. With the vast field of Indian studies still largely unexplored, he could exclaim after discussing the concentration of the ancient sages on metaphysics,

No wonder that a nation like the Indian cared so little for history, no wonder that social and political virtues were little cultivated and the ideas of the useful and the beautiful were scarcely known to them.²

As was inevitable, this attitude has provoked certain nationalistic writers to the other extreme of claiming for Indian political theory a separate identity and completeness of development which it never had. Some have attempted to read Western concepts and conclusions into it

MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND, an officer of the United States Foreign Service, is the American consul in Bremen, Germany. He has previously served in Switzerland, Burma, India, and East Africa. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and is the author of *Power and Morals*, which has been published by Columbia University Press.

¹ W. W. Willoughby, *The Nature of the State* (New York, 1903), pp. 12, 42; William Dunning, *History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* (New York, 1905), p. xix; see also Paul Janet, *Histoire de la science politique* (3rd ed.; Paris, 1887), I, 26; Maurice Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda* (New York, 1908), p. 4.

² Max Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (2nd ed.; London, 1860), p. 10.

to a point where it seems like little more than Locke, Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill in terminological disguise. Others have tried to show how really secular and amoral it is by overemphasizing the importance of a few works such as Kautilya's *Arthashastra*.³

The truth, as usual, lies between these extreme views. The valuable elements in Indian political and ethical thought will not be found in an exaggerated emphasis on so-called secular tendencies and on similarity to Western theories, which run counter to the main stream of the country's traditions and speculation and embody the very qualities incompatible with that control of power by morals which is the primary function of political ethics. On the other hand, Indian thinkers have certainly not all remained engrossed purely in metaphysical speculation, disdaining to give attention to the practical issues of man's political as well as personal conduct. There are certain concepts, found in nearly all of the great philosophical schools, which have direct relevance to the great problems of power and morals.

One of these primary concepts is that of *dharma*, which in many respects resembles the traditional Western concept of natural law. Modern Indian writers have described *dharma* in terms which could be applied without change to the natural law; and some have specifically noted an identity, or at least close similarity, between the two concepts. Thus Dr. Beni Prasad claims that classical Europe fastened on the law of nature as a natural, universal law of reason implanted as a principle of life in all hearts. Early in India there arose a similar idea which runs through the whole of Indian philosophy and literature.⁴ And Dr. Benoy Kumar Sarker writes that "the ethical conception of law as the dictate of conscience, i.e., as *jus naturale* has a long tradition in Hindu thought."⁵

In a country like India where, until modern times, even those constitutional checks to power were lacking which may temporarily maintain a sort of order in a system of political institutions originally developed under the influence of ethical norms, the problem of power was reduced to its bare essentials. The king, the emperor, *had* power. There was no question about that. The concept which Indian thinkers elaborated to justify and define his power they called *danda*, a term with many similarities of meaning to the Western term "sovereignty."⁶ *Danda* is of the very essence of the state, implying the power to coerce, restrain,

³ See, for example, Ajit Kumar Sen, *Studies in Hindu Political Thought* (Calcutta, 1926).

⁴ *The Theory of Government in Ancient India* (Allahabad, 1927), p. 18.

⁵ *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1922), p. 208.

⁶ *Manu Samhita* ("Sacred Books of the East Series" [Oxford, Clarendon Press], Vol. XXV), vii, 18, 22. Cf. Benoy Kumar Sarker, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

and punish according to need. But it does not involve unmitigated power linked to no criteria for its use. *Danda* has purpose, and that purpose is to guarantee and enforce those conditions making for happiness and righteousness according to the standard of *dharma*.⁷ In other words, *dharma* imposes an obligation upon the ruler to use his *danda* in accordance with the precepts of right and wrong deriving from *dharma*.

Basic to the traditional Western idea of natural law is the attribution of order and purpose to the universe, with particular reference to the position of man in it. The nature of rational beings, which determines their essential functions, provides a standard under which right is acting in accordance with such nature and wrong "going against" such nature. Underlying the concept of *dharma* is also a sense of something inherent in the very nature of things which governs the desirability or undesirability of action—a criterion of conduct not of their making to which men are obliged to conform. But the term, while used more or less frequently by nearly all of the Indian schools of thought,⁸ has never received the same systematic and precise analysis which Scholastic philosophers have given to the natural law. Such definitions as exist are sometimes unclear and usually more descriptive than specific.

An examination of relevant Hindu texts and commentaries discloses that *dharma* is used in at least ten different senses: (1) in the strict etymological meaning of upholder, supporter, sustainer;⁹ (2) as religious ordinances or rites;¹⁰ (3) as virtue, uprightness, a category of ethics as opposed to vice or sin;¹¹ (4) as truth;¹² (5) as duty;¹³ (6) as that from whose observance of which results happiness and final

⁷ *Manu Samhita*, VII, 22, 23.

⁸ "Next to the category of reality, that of the *dharma* is the most important concept in Indian thought." S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (2 vols., 2nd ed.; London, 1929), I, 52.

⁹ *Rigveda* ("Sacred Books of the East Series," Vol. XXXII), I, 187, 1; X, 92, 2. Cf. *Karna Parva*, 70: "It is called *dharma* because it holds all beings." (The great Indian epic, *The Mahabharata*, is divided into eighteen books called Parvans, plus supplementary materials. A Parva is therefore a book of the Mahabharata. The entire hundred-thousand-odd verses have been translated into English by P. C. Roy [Calcutta, 1884-96].)

¹⁰ *Rigveda*, I, 22, 18; V, 26, 6; VIII, 43, 24; IX, 64, 1.

¹¹ *Anusāsana Parva*, 105.

¹² *Brihadārnyaka Upanishad*, (German trans. Paul Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda* [Leipzig, 1897]), I, 4, 11-14. Cf. Benimadhab Barua, *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1921), pp. 87, 335-36.

¹³ *Aitareya-Brahmana*, trans. Martin Haug (Bombay, 1863) VII, 17; *Chandogya Upanishad*, in Deussen, *op. cit.*, 2, 23; *Santi Parva*, LXVIII, 16; *Bhagavad-Gita*, chap. iii (there are numerous English translations of the *Gita*; the classic translation from a literary point of view remains that of Sir Edward Arnold); *Manu Samhita*, VII, 21, 22, 24.

beatitude;¹⁴ (7) as positive or state-made law;¹⁵ (8) as fixed principles or rules of conduct;¹⁶ (9) in a broader sense, as "everything that is fixed, or to which the individual is bound; and this in a twofold sense, both positively and negatively, by deriving from it support (*dhar*) and obligation alike";¹⁷ (10) and finally in the broad yet limited meaning of "the privileges, duties and obligations of a man, his standard of conduct as a member of the Aryan community, as a member of one of the castes, as a person in a particular stage of life."¹⁸

All this profusion of definition may seem at first sight to reduce to wishful thinking any emphasis on essential similarity between *dharma* and the natural law.¹⁹ Yet closer scrutiny will show that most of the various definitions given involve a notion of something akin to natural law, even though they may merely describe an effect or attribute, or refer to concepts which, though related to the natural law, are given different names in the West. In other words, while none of the usual definitions of *dharma* correspond exactly to natural law, the sum total of the meanings they convey seems to include within its scope certain basic elements of the natural law. There is apparently a norm of action independent of man's will, deriving its criteria from the functional order inherent in the very nature of things, and the obligation to observe that norm is a moral one sanctioned both by eudaemonistic and theological considerations.

All of which is well and good. But apart from the relative vagueness of the concept and its lack of systematic analysis in Indian thought, any attempt to identify *dharma* with natural law raises certain further difficulties which cannot be ignored. Generalizations about Indian philosophy are often too broad. Although many are prone to look upon the thought of the country as one in motive, inspiration, and direction, Indian thinkers have sometimes differed greatly, even on fundamental

¹⁴ *Jaiminiya Brahmana; The Upanishad Brahmana* (ed. by H. Oertel with translation and notes in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, XVI, 79-269), I, 1, 2.

¹⁵ Narada, *Smriti* ("Sacred Books of the East Series," Vol. XXXIII), introduction; I, 2; *Rajadharmanusasana Parva*, trans. Kisor Mohan Ganguli (Calcutta, 1895-1905), p. 91.

¹⁶ *Rigveda*, LV, 53, 3; V, 63, 7; VI, 70, 1; VII, 89, 5.

¹⁷ Betty Heimann, *Indian and Western Philosophy* (London, 1937), p. 68.

¹⁸ Pandurang Vaman Kane, *History of Dharmasastra* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930), p. 2: "It is in this sense that the word seems to be used in the well-known exhortation to the pupil contained in the *Taittiriya-upanishad* . . . 'speak the truth, practice (your own) *dharma* . . .'"

¹⁹ There are, of course, also the special meanings which Buddhism and Jainism give to the term. See Maurice Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, *Buddhist Literature and Jainist Literature*, trans. S. Ketkar and H. Kohn (Calcutta, 1933), pp. 264, 313, 317, 323, 331, 383, 459, 576.

metaphysical issues. In these cases, even similarity of terminology has not meant similarity of premises or conclusions. On the other hand, the point need not be stretched too far. We may note certain common tendencies in Indian thought; and these have surrounded the theory of *dharma* with modifying meanings and associations which for some raise serious doubts about its validity as a foundation for political and social ethics.

Certain students of Indian philosophy have claimed that the *dharma* concept is so inextricably bound up with distinctive cosmological theories that it cannot in any way be identified with the Western concept of natural law. Thus Dr. Betty Heimann defines *dharma* as

the idea of universal justice, involving responsibility in its widest sense, not, however, in the guise of any external compulsion but as immanent necessity, so that all that has ever come into existence produces its specific reaction or effect—the law of action and reaction as laid down by the principle of *Karma*, which is no ethical dogma in any Western sense . . .²⁰

And *karma* she describes as “purely biological ethics, revealed in the inviolable law of cause and effect, and imposing on the individual a superpersonal responsibility towards both the future and the cosmos.”²¹ Moreover,

while India does not regard the will as being determined and predestined by God, there is nevertheless a type of inner determination, or rather immanent predestination or predisposition, in that the individual is inseparably bound to his own almost mechanical law of self-development, in the sense of the realization of its most powerful impulses.²²

Such an interpretation raises crucial issues. If Dr. Heimann's view of *dharma* is correct, if Indian ethics are entirely “biological and cosmic,” then any comparison between *dharma* and the natural law of the West is obviously invalid, and Indian political and social theory as a whole logically falls within the most rigid category of determinism.

But does Dr. Heimann's description actually fit the reality? To begin with, her approach is too purely philological. In addition to the strict etymological meanings of terms, it is necessary to consider their acquired meanings as revealed by specific contexts and the general trends of thought of the philosophical systems in which they appear. To transpose Vedic definitions and concepts into the classical period

²⁰ Heimann, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

of Indian thought without adequate qualification or recognition of their changes in meaning is entirely unwarranted. Among modern Indian writers, there is a wide variety of attitudes on the question of human autonomy, ranging from strict determinism to broad voluntarism; and the same word will often take on different denotations when used by those who are far apart on this critical issue.

Neo-Scholastics will agree that the admission of free will is absolutely essential to a valid and binding scheme of ethical norms, not necessarily in all cases, but in all those cases where the moral code is to have any meaning as a criterion of desirable conduct. Despite a singular lack of reference by classical Indian thinkers to the problem of free will, there is no reason to believe that they commonly repudiated voluntarism.²³ In fact quite the contrary, for much of their ethical theory implies human freedom of will. Why, for example, make lists of virtues, as Indian writers are so fond of doing, and say that men ought to acquire them and guide their actions by them, if they have no choice in the matter?

If the denial of free will is not a general characteristic of Indian thought, ancient or modern, Dr. Heimann's whole analysis of Indian ethics loses force, and with it her attempt to link *dharma* to "immanent predestination." It is true that the pure monism of the Advaita school of Vedanta philosophy, best exemplified in the writings of Samkara, logically leads to the identification of *dharma* with the iron laws of the physical universe, and to the submersion of all clear concepts in the shadow world of *maya* ("illusion").²⁴ But the dualistic tendency of the *Vedanta Sūtras* and the *Bhagavad Gita*, the mitigated monism of Ramanuja and Vallabha, the out-and-out dualism of Madhva,²⁵ all represent a strong antideterminist element in Indian thought which Dr. Heimann fails to take into account.

The apparently intimate connection between *dharma* and the *karma* principle would to some, however, seem to add a dissonant note to any attempt at comparison with natural law. Here again fact and superficial impression differ considerably. *Karma* is one of those unique,

²³ In an unpublished letter written to the Reverend G. Dandoy, S.J., the famous Belgian Sanskrit scholar, Dr. Louis de la Vallée Poussin stated in effect that he had never been able to discover an exact Sanskrit equivalent for free will, but that it was undoubtedly assumed by many Indian writers of the classical period.

²⁴ See G. Dandoy, S.J., *L'Ontologie du Vedanta* (Paris, 1932), for a brilliant analysis of the Advaita philosophy. Another useful work is Professor W. S. Urquhart's *The Vedanta and Modern Thought* (Oxford, 1928).

²⁵ *Vedanta Sūtras* ("Sacred Books of the East Series," Vol. XXXIV). The best general discussion of non-Advaita schools of the Vedanta is found in P. Johanns, *Vers le Christ par le Vedanta* (Louvain, 1932). See also Nicol Macnicol, *Indian Theism* (Oxford, 1915), esp. chaps. v, vii, viii.

all-embracing Indian concepts which the Western mind finds so difficult to grasp. The tendency is to associate it with some more familiar idea such as the law of physical causation, which it resembles in part but which so inadequately expresses its complete meaning. It involves a vast body of speculation about its relation to *samsâra* (metempsychosis) and the methods by which men may escape from the cycle of rebirth. In the essential core common to both Hinduism and Buddhism, it may be described as the doctrine that we reap what we sow in the moral sphere—that we never reap anything that we do not sow, nor do we sow anything that we will not reap. Properly understood, *karma* is not “purely biological ethics.” It does not preclude human freedom; actually it

. . . supposes free will, whilst in more than one way limiting it. *Karma* is not fate. It is not a reckless energy that predetermines our ends without any co-operation of our own. It is a force brought into being by *our* deeds and constantly altered or modified by them. It is also an energy that we cannot arrest once it has been fully realized, but whose potentialities we can paralyze by severing our connection with it. It thus leaves to individual free will two parts to play: to modify the future course of *samsâra* and to release the individual from it.²⁶

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that certain aspects of the *karma* doctrine have tended to foster a fatalism having little to do with free action ordinated to ethical norms. As Professor S. Radhakrishnan points out,

Unfortunately, the theory of karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his best. It was made an excuse for inertia and timidity and was turned into a message of despair and not of hope. It said to the sinner, “Not only are you a wreck, but that is all you ever could have been. That was your preordained being from the beginning of time!”²⁷

Such an interpretation of *karma* apparently left small scope for the positive influence of *dharma* as a guide to desirable deeds. Yet the concept of *dharma* persisted and exercised an antifatalistic influence, even though *dharma* might be conceived as that standard of conduct by the observance of which men could escape from or improve their *karma*. Anyone who has lived in India and studied its thought will

²⁶ G. Dandoy, S.J., *Karma Evil Punishment* (Calcutta, 1940), p. 20.

²⁷ *The Hindu View of Life* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 76-77. See also A. C. Underwood, *Contemporary Thought of India* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1930), pp. 156 ff., 197 ff.

have noted a sort of unresolved dualism, the linking of primary causation in the same instance with both volitional and nonvolitional factors.

A further question which some may ask is whether, despite its constant use and apparent importance, the concept of *dharma* really has any functional significance in Indian thought. The contention of Dr. Albert Schweitzer is that the various philosophical systems of India have tended in the direction of what he calls "world and life negation" as opposed to "world and life affirmation." "World and life negation" he defines as man's

. . . regarding existence as he experiences it in himself and as it is developed in the world as something meaningless and sorrowful, and he resolves accordingly (a) to bring life to a standstill in himself by mortifying his will-to-live, and (b) to renounce all activity which aims at improvement of the conditions of life in this world.²⁸

Now the implications of such a viewpoint for ethical theory are obvious, since "ethics demand of man that he should interest himself in the world and in what goes on in it; and, what is more, simply compel him to action."²⁹ For those who give themselves over unreservedly to world negation, *dharma* loses all positive value. It cannot enjoin to good action, because only that which leads to the end of action is good. The problem of the control of power, for example, its direction into channels of morally permissible activity, is essentially meaningless in terms of world-negation. For power becomes one of those positive entities which men must repudiate because at bottom they have no reality. Obviously, if everyone felt the same way about this, denying to himself the right to use power as part of a general denial of action, the problem would disappear. But in the real world—in India as much as elsewhere—power is an ever-present fact, as is the possibility of its abuse; and only a positive ethical system which provides rules for the doing of deeds, not merely for their complete avoidance, can begin to control power through moral obligation.

There is some force in Schweitzer's thesis, but many qualifications are necessary. As he himself admits, the exaggerated view of such writers as Arthur Schopenhauer and Paul Deussen that "Indian thought is completely governed by the idea of world and life negation" is open to considerable doubt.³⁰ While the term *moksa* ("release, salvation") is common to the various Hindu systems, as is the admission of the possibility of *moksa*, conceptions of the process and its result vary

²⁸ *Indian Thought and Its Development* (London: Henry Holt, 1936), pp. 1-2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

greatly according to basic metaphysical, psychological, and ethical doctrines.³¹ Moreover, Schweitzer's contrast between world-negation and world-affirmation is partly beside the point, for it stresses disparity between modern, secular Western thought, which is itself essentially unethical, and certain unethical aspects of Indian thought, both of which, by different modes of approach, end in the same moral impasse. A more useful contrast, in many respects a comparison, is between traditional Indian thought and medieval Western thought. In a series of books,³² René Guenon has stressed certain significant similarities of general philosophical approach in Indian and Scholastic thought. Although his treatment is weakened by a failure to grasp differences, he correctly points out that the highly developed interest in metaphysics which is characteristic of both is not a source of weakness but of strength, since concern for the ultimates of being is the necessary prerequisite to any sound theory of values.

In any case, whatever its negative tendencies, Indian thought has also often contained a strong ethical note, especially in the post-Upanishad period—although sometimes, as in Samkara, merely as a concession to those who follow the lower truth, the less perfect way.³³ As a key concept of Indian ethics, *dharma* is not, therefore, merely a verbal appendage, much mentioned but of no real importance in the context of the country's philosophy.

No claim is made that the content of *dharma* as expounded by specific writers is always the same, or that in its most complete expositions *dharma* is always identical in content with the traditional Western natural law (though, as a matter of fact, it often is so identical). Little is gained by a strained and artificial attempt to read entire unity into the content of ethical systems which may derive from interpretations of reality differing in many respects. There is a general tendency of the unbiased human mind to agree in the analysis of basic moral realities; but variances in culture, physical environment, economic development,

³¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the various theories of *moksa*, both of the early and later period, see the splendid series of articles on this subject written by the Reverend G. Dandoy, S.J., which appeared in the *Light of the East* (Ranchi, India), Vol. IX (June-September, 1931), Nos. 9-12; Vol. X (October, 1932—September, 1933), Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 12; Vol. XIV (October, 1935—February, 1936), Nos. 3, 4, 5. In a study as yet incomplete and unpublished, Father Dandoy has attempted a synthesis of *moksa* theories which the writer has been able to consult and has found extremely enlightening.

³² See especially his *East and West*, trans. William Massey (London, 1941), pp. 181 ff.; also *The Crisis of the Modern World* (2nd ed.; London, 1947).

³³ See M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, trans. Mrs. S. Ketkar (Calcutta, 1927), I, 352, 406, 415, 424 ff., 429, 529, 588, 597. See also W. S. Urquhart, *op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff., for an excellent discussion of Samkara's ethics.

or in stage of social organization have led to, in fact have required in terms of a functional ethics, different formulations of many of those numerous permissive or concessive principles which must change with changing conditions that affect their validity as means. The great question of the validity of violence as means admittedly involves issues on which the Western and Indian approaches, starting from different evaluations of the worth of certain types of activity, have arrived at somewhat different conclusions. When such differences exist, the problem becomes one of rational analysis to determine which approach fits best within the criteria of a functional ethics under twentieth-century conditions.

If *dharma* is essentially an Indian version of the natural law, it might seem that its role in certain political commentators like Kautilya lends support to those who argue that natural law can have little relation to the harsh realities of political tactics and action in the concrete. While admitting the existence of *dharma*,³⁴ such writers end in sheer Machiavellism when they start giving practical advice to rulers. There were several reasons for this development in India not unlike the various historical influences which produced Machiavelli in late fifteenth-century Italy; and just as Machiavellism does not prove the natural law unnecessary or doomed to be ineffective, but actually emphasizes the need of permanent standards of conduct for political activity other than mere expediency, so the Kautilyan political amoralism simply once again proves the impossibility of controlling power without principles enforced by the coercion of moral obligation.

If power is not controlled by morals, then of course the Machiavellians are correct in picturing politics as nothing but an extended jungle fight, with victory going to the strongest, wildest, most aggressive contestant. If, however, power is to be controlled by morals, then morality must be based on a concept like *dharma* or natural law which involves universal principles of action inherent in the very nature of things. The fact that such a concept does appear in dissimilar speculative, as well as cultural, backgrounds bears striking witness to the abidingly valid elements in natural law theory and indicates the essential fallacy of the relativist criticism, which assumes that because the customs, habits, and civilizations of men change, nothing constant and universal remains in their ethical thinking.

³⁴ Kautilya himself wrote: "Dharma (righteous law) is eternal truth holding sway over the world." *Arihasasira*, trans. Sama Shastri (Mysore, 1909), p. 191.

ETHICS AND THEOLOGY

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Christian philosophy, as M. Étienne Gilson has shown,¹ is a phenomenon historically observable and therefore intrinsically (*de jure*) possible. Catholic thought in the West, as everyone now realizes, passed from the unitary stage of Christian wisdom to a stage in which philosophy and theology were understood as distinct sciences. In this development, the distinction between ethics (moral philosophy) and theology seems to have been made later than that between metaphysics and theology.

When Christian thinkers first distinguished between ethics and theology, they seem to have thought that ethics, though it is not a sufficient guide for Christian action, is yet adequately constituted as a science of morality in itself, and at least *de jure* separately from theology.² This intrinsic independence of ethics was maintained for a long time. In recent years the separation of ethics from theology has been opposed, particularly in the writings of M. Jacques Maritain.³

THE POSITION OF MARITAIN

The stand of M. Maritain is so well known that it needs only to be summarized here. According to him, there is a natural ethics;⁴ but it (*a*) is not a true moral science,⁵ (*b*) is not purely and simply true,⁶ and

THE REVEREND GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J., is an associate editor of *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN* and an instructor in the Department of Philosophy of Saint Louis University. He received his doctorate degree from the University of Toronto.

¹ Of set purpose in *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (2me éd.; Paris: Vrin, 1944); also in *Le Thomisme* (5me éd.; Paris: Vrin, 1944), *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (2me éd.; Paris: Payot, 1944), and at least incidentally in most of his work.

² See Jacques Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1940), pp. 74, 127-28. (Permission to quote from *Science and Wisdom* has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

³ *Science and Wisdom*, and earlier, particularly in *De la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris: Desclée, 1933).

⁴ ". . . natural ethics really exists" (*Science and Wisdom*, p. 166).

⁵ ". . . the non-Christian as such cannot attain a moral philosophy adequate to its object, which is the regulation of human acts: a moral philosophy which is in an absolute sense a moral science" (*ibid.*, p. 126).

⁶ ". . . a strict and absolute science of human acts, an ethic which is purely and simply true (and not *secundum quid*) cannot abstract from the basic and universal conditions that are imposed on man in point of existence here below.

(c) can prescribe good acts but cannot make the subject good.⁷

a) In practical knowledge, the first principle of knowledge is the end of action. Natural ethics does not know the end; and so of itself is really only a prephilosophical discipline, presenting a mass of materials which a real science of morality will use.⁸

b) A practical science cannot abstract from the basic and universal conditions of all human action.⁹ But natural ethics ignores the true end of man, as well as the infused virtues and the gifts.¹⁰ And so a purely natural ethics is illusory¹¹ and even positively misleading.¹² At best it is a hypothetical "science" directed to the goodness of a purely possible being.¹³

c) Natural ethics cannot make a man good, even in the way in which a science should work to produce this effect. For it knows nothing of grace and charity (and we may well add that it knows nothing about the sacraments and other means of grace).¹⁴

Thus it is not possible in fact unless the true end in fact assigned to human life and the concrete conditions, the actual state of things in which human nature is existentially placed in relation to this end, are known" (*ibid.*, pp. 108-9).

⁷ "But the prescription of certain good acts is not enough to form a practical science, a true science of the use of freedom, a science which prescribes not only good acts, but which also determines how the *acting subject* can live a life of consistent goodness and organise rightly his whole universe of action. For it is the subject himself who needs to be made good" (*ibid.*, p. 162).

⁸ "It is *essentially* insufficient in the sense that no science directive of human conduct—no science pure and simple worthy of the name—can exist without taking into account the real and actual last end of human life. Now 'independent moral philosophy' does not know this end. And so it simply cannot be a true practical science capable of directing human conduct even in a secondary way" (*ibid.*, p. 165).

⁹ "Philosophy cannot be *pure* philosophy: it is only imperfectly autonomous: it must be subalternated to theology because its object is not only human but—in the measure in which it is existentially human—also divine and supernatural" (*ibid.*, p. 126; and see above, n. 6).

¹⁰ "Supposing you confide the task of guiding your life to an 'independent moral philosophy'; you do not know what is the true end of your life: you set about organising it without the help of the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit" (*ibid.*, p. 164).

¹¹ "... a purely philosophical moral science . . . would not be practical. It would be a practical science which was not really practical—and for this reason illusory . . . designed to establish in a state of goodness a separated essence" (*ibid.*, p. 163).

¹² "If he seeks to conceptualise and systematise it all in a texture of *pure reason*, with the sole aid of philosophy, he will construct, in fact, not a purely philosophical moral philosophy dedicated to a *homo possibilis*, like that to which we have just referred, but a false morality, designed for man as he is with its axis all awry" (*ibid.*, p. 167). "Thus, if a man were to take such a purely philosophical moral science as a guide for his life, he would surely be led astray" (*ibid.*, p. 164).

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-65; 163; cf. *supra*, n. 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63; cf. *supra*, n. 10.

Hence, it is clear that moral philosophy must depend somehow on faith and theology.¹⁵ The deficiencies of natural ethics lead M. Maritain to look for a "moral philosophy adequately considered."¹⁶ The origin of such a moral philosophy, and its relations with theology, are to be understood as instances of *subalternation*.¹⁷ St. Thomas had used this notion to explain certain relationships of sciences among themselves.¹⁸ Subalternation consists in this, that a lower science receives its principles from a higher.¹⁹ Now, in ethics, because it is a practical science, the end is the first principle. That the end of man is in reality the beatific vision is known only by faith. Hence, since ethics borrows this knowledge from theology and revelation, ethics adequately considered is a subalternated science.

IS SUBALTERNATION APPLICABLE?

M. Maritain himself realizes that the notion of subalternation is not fully able to express the relation between the science of morals and theology. He says that moral philosophy is subalternated to theology "in a subordinate and perfective way, not in a radical or originative way."²⁰ This is to recognize that, if there is subalternation, it is not the same as the relation of music to mathematics.

But it may well be doubted that subalternation occurs here at all. If a true science of ethics cannot be constituted without revelation, then no obligation can be ultimately rationally grounded without revelation. Maritain surely does not mean that there is no obligation to accept revelation. Yet in his explanation the source of this obligation seems to be a merely possible, unreal state.

More fundamental and pertinent is the consideration of the nature of science in itself. A principle of science is supposed to be operative throughout the science according to its second movement (*secundum viam iudicii*). Now, is it a fact that the end of man precisely under

¹⁵ "... his [the Christian philosopher's] reason is only scientifically established in moral truth—to which it tends by natural desire—by resting on a higher science" (*ibid.*, p. 94); "en s'éclairant auprès de la théologie et en se subordonnant à elle" (*Les Degrés du savoir* [Paris: Desclée, 1932], p. 895, n. 1; cf. p. 622).

¹⁶ *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 174-210.

¹⁷ "Moral philosophy adequately considered is subalternated to theology for a factual reason; because of the actual state of human nature and of the last end to which it is in fact ordained" (*ibid.*, p. 174).

¹⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *In de Trin.*, 5. 1 ad 5 (ed. Paul Wyser, O.P.; Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1948; p. 30).

¹⁹ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, I. 1. 2.

²⁰ "That is why I regard moral philosophy adequately considered as 'subalternated to theology by virtue of its principles, in a subordinate and perfective way, not in a radical or originative way'" (*Science and Wisdom*, p. 187, where M. Maritain quotes his previous statement in *De la philosophie chrétienne*, p. 248; cf. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 234-35; 238-39).

the formality of the beatific vision is an operative principle in ethics? In other words, in what ethical problem do we reach full intelligibility only by reducing the argument all the way to the beatific vision as such? The reduction of an argument to the principle that God is the end of man is what actually occurs.

Suppose we grant, for the purpose of clarification, that no non-Christian philosopher has done this. Suppose we grant that only those who believe in the beatific vision have admitted that God is the end of man. Can we now legitimately argue, no philosopher without faith has done this and therefore natural reason cannot do it? Such a passage from a historical fact to the impossibility of its opposite seems to be mere historicism. For historicism is the identification of philosophy with the philosophers. Is this not done when, without further ado, we identify the failure of philosophers with the failure of philosophy?

M. Maritain of course makes the transition on a doctrinal ground, that natural ethics is "essentially insufficient."²¹ This argument supposes that the end of man, as a principle of ethics, is derived from faith. Is this literally true?

ETHICS AND THE END OF MAN

In all practical knowledge, the end functions as principle of scientific knowledge. In order that a science be completely constituted in its own order, the principle must be ultimate in its own order. Consequently, the principle of intelligibility and science in ethics will be the ultimate end of the actions of man.

What is the end of man? To answer this question, we must begin with our experience of human action and human nature. All men naturally desire happiness, and all men are aware that the ultimate end of their activity is happiness. This indeterminate notion of happiness is not sufficient, for we also know that happiness for us consists in the possession of a good *thing*. We must therefore look for the good thing, which will give happiness without qualification when it is possessed.

To locate this thing which gives happiness, we can first use an argument from exclusion. St. Thomas uses this type of argument to show that no created good can fulfill the function of making man completely happy.²² We can also proceed positively, from a consideration of the unlimited capacity of human intellect and will, to see that only

²¹ Cf. text quoted above in n. 8.

²² For example, in *ST*, I-II. 2. 5-7.

the infinite truth and goodness can be such an object.²³ Furthermore, by considering the spiritual nature of God and the proper specific activity of man, we can prove that God is to be possessed as end by intellect and will.

St. Thomas does not say that any particular nonbelieving philosopher reached and maintained this conclusion. But his own procedure is a thoroughly rational one; his arguments are not *based* on faith, nor does he smuggle in a proposition from theology under the guise of a conclusion.

THE ANTINOMY OF PURELY NATURAL PRACTICAL REASON

The end of man is God, to be possessed by intellect and will. Let us look at this conclusion once more. The end brings happiness by being possessed.²⁴ God, who is a spiritual substance, can be possessed through no material activity, but only through a spiritual one, that is, through intellect and will. Now, through our knowledge we possess things only intentionally—*lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis*.²⁵ And in the case of God, we run into a further difficulty. For any species which represents God for us is essentially inadequate. It is

²³ As St. Thomas does, for example, in *Compend. Theol.* 104-6; *Quodlibet.* 8. 19; *CG*, III. 50-52.

The problem of the formal constitution of ethics as a *science* has been handled by M. Maritain without any explicit reference to the much-discussed question of whether there is any possible natural end for man (except perhaps for a sentence in *Science and Wisdom*, p. 179).

In general, this article assumes that M. Maritain's procedure is not only a possible, but really the correct one. But it may be helpful to state my position by way of a note (and without any textual or doctrinal proof which obviously could not be inserted here).

As far as the *finis qui* is concerned (i.e., the good to which man's nature is ordered), there is a natural end, and that end is God, as the arguments adduced above show. As far as the *finis quo* is concerned (i.e., the possession of the good), there is no natural end at all. Is it not a contradiction to say that there is a natural end (*finis qui*) which cannot be obtained by the activity and resources of the nature whose end it is? That this is an antinomy is precisely one of the points that this article has been trying to make. Yet it is not a contradiction, for, In St. Thomas's words, *quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliququaliter possumus* (*ST*, I-II. 5. 5 ad 1 [Ottawa 748a]; with a reference to Aristotle, *Ethics*, III [1112b27]). It is important to remember that St. Thomas makes this remark precisely in the same connection.

For the proof of this point of view, see the brilliant paper by Anton C. Pegis, "The Science of Ethics in Relation to a Supernatural End," to be published in *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*. See also n. 28, below.

²⁴ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, I-II. 5. 1, and II-II. 28.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 85. 2.

obvious within our present experience that our knowledge of God is highly inadequate. And it is clear that as long as we know through any created species (acquired or infused)²⁶ we do not *possess God* through it.²⁷ This, too, as far as it goes, is true knowledge, certain, and independent of faith.

If we juxtapose these two results, "God and only God can be the end of man" and "God in himself cannot be possessed by man," we seem by natural reason to arrive at an antinomy. These are not contradictory statements. We are saying, "God is the end to be possessed (*finis qui*)" and "We know of no way by which (*finis quo*) we can possess God in himself." The good to be possessed can be located definitely; no terminative way of possession can be discovered.²⁸

It is possible, absolutely speaking, that a man maintain his hold on both parts of the antinomy. Historically, it does not seem that any non-Christian philosopher was able to do so, and this because a man of great insight cannot long keep himself impaled on the horns of a dilemma.²⁹ And so St. Thomas makes that penetrating and deeply sympathetic remark: "In this we may well see what anguish their great minds suffered."³⁰

We can be freed from this painful situation, and from the consequent temptation to throw ourselves either into the embraces of created goods (especially ourselves) or into the darkness of a natural "mysticism," by

²⁶ This argument is true even of any infused species, no matter how preternaturally perfect it may be supposed to be; cf. *ST*, I. 12. 2.

²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, I. 62. 2, and 12. 2.

²⁸ To deny the natural "endlessness" of man is (a) to imagine that the mind can be fixed on an *image* of God in a single unchanging contemplative act, and thus (b) to identify the created nontemporal duration of a created spirit with the eternal infinite "now" of God or (c) at least to suppose that the beatific vision is like a natural act of knowledge with a special object, whereas because of its supernatural object it is supernatural in principle—it is a participation in God's own life.

The natural "endlessness" of man is to an endless series of ever more perfect acts of knowledge, thus corresponding to the potential infinity of intellect. Such a state would also be one of permanently acquired, ever-increasing joy. Compare with this theory the careful critique of determinate limited natural ends made by Joseph Buckley, S.M., *Man's Last End* (Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), and compare also his somewhat similar theory of indetermination.

This differs from the Kantian theory with which it might be confused in two ways which make it a totally different doctrine: (a) it is not a continual increase in moral goodness with a corresponding possibility of loss, but the secure possession of a state of reward; (b) the growth in analogous (both infused and acquired) knowledge is not the end or good to be possessed, but the means of possession (*finis quo*).

²⁹ Unless such a man have a deep humility to recognize his creaturely limitations, and a serene, loving trust in God.

³⁰ "In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia" (*CG*, III. 48).

accepting from faith the doctrine of a supernatural, intuitive-possessive, and therefore beatifying vision of God.

What are we doing when we do this? It seems clear that we are not assuming a principle, not taking on trust that God is the end (*finis qui*) of man. Only if *this* principle were borrowed, if its whole intelligibility derived from faith, would there be question of *subalternation*.³¹

THE MATTER OF ETHICS: HUMAN ACTION

In practical reasoning there are two sets of principles: one is the first principle of the practical intellect; the other is the thing which is given in experience. One of the things of this second sort is man himself.

M. Maritain points out that the existential condition of man is that he is in a supernatural order, in which he is either fallen and in sin or fallen but redeemed. Maritain insists that natural ethics, taking man as it finds him, cannot correctly understand him. He concludes that natural ethics from this point of view will be a false morality.³² But if the moral philosopher accepts the doctrine of original sin and of grace from theology, he tells us, then such subalternated morality will be true.

Granted that the ethicist needs to know man as he is, with his conditions of sin and grace. But into what particular problem does the doctrine of original sin enter as a *premise*? We certainly must admit that man's tendency to sin, to excess or defect in particular ways, does enter into ethical arguments. It is also true that the doctrine of original sin helps us understand the evil tendencies of man. Nevertheless, though the revealed fact is necessary, it seems to enter only indirectly into the constitution of the science of ethics.

In this same general area of discussion, Maritain insists that according to St. Thomas the acquired virtues can be called virtues purely and simply when they are with charity.³³ This remark insinuates the notion

³¹ Maritain holds for the specification and constitution of moral philosophy by the *finis quo*; he seems also to hold a natural and naturally knowable terminative *finis quo* for man in the state of pure nature, which is quite different from the actual *finis quo* known through revelation. Hence it is quite appropriate that he holds the falsity of natural ethics, and the subalternation of true ethics.

Material natures have a proximate end which is immanent, to which they are strictly proportioned and limited, and which is imposed on them. Spiritual natures, because of intellect and will, have a finality which goes all the way to their ultimate end. Their operation (understanding and willing) is not to being and good as abstractions, but as subsistent. But this subsistent being and good is not physically imposed as end; it is proposed, to be freely accepted.

³² *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 166-67; cf. *supra*, n. 12.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

In this connection, a remark may be permitted on M. Maritain's conception of the imperfection of the acquired moral virtues in a man who lacks charity.

of subalternation. Let us consider whether it properly expresses the present relation.

It is perfectly true that the right use and ordering of the means to the end is not wholly "right" (and therefore is not prudence) except when the end is right.³⁴ The ethician can know this and use his knowledge in considering prudence, without even knowing that man cannot be rightly ordered to his end except through charity. For to understand the function of prudence he need merely know that it takes place within an order to the right end. This natural knowledge will be incomplete (that is, not fully specified, determined), but it does *not* seem to be *wrong*. The ethician will be helped when he knows the function of charity. Such knowledge does not enter into the constitution of his argument, though it truly and even tremendously clarifies it. But such clarification, precious as it is, is by no means constitution.

Something similar is to be said about the circumstance of "the end of the agent." It is again perfectly true that the end of the agent enters into the moral constitution of every human act. It is also perfectly true that in the present order man's will is either informed by charity or is in the state of aversion from God. And so every human act is either good and supernaturally meritorious, or it is not. To decide this for any particular action is not the job of ethics, however, but of conscience for the individual himself and of casuistry for a director of souls.

An example may make this point clearer. A man may do the external act of almsgiving from the motive proper to that act. He may likewise do it from lust or vanity on the one hand, or from penance or faith or supernatural charity on the other. Now, the ethician has to discuss the relationships which the virtues have one to the other. He must understand and explain how the end of the agent informs every act, even one flowing more proximately from a particular virtue (or vice). But having said that, he goes on to consider almsgiving as almsgiving, justice as justice, and the like. To know that an act is to be judged in a particular way in the concrete is an important major item of ethical knowledge—yet the ethician is not the conscience of mankind to do this work of judging. Much of the ethician's concern is with the specific character of certain acts, and it is not derogatory to ethics as

Maritain, following John of St. Thomas, says that they are imperfect, because they are "in the state of a disposition" (*ibid.*, p. 146). It seems that this doctrine is at variance with St. Thomas, *ST*, I-II. 65. 2; and though Maritain tries to justify it by using 65. 1 (*Science and Wisdom*, pp. 149-52), a comparative study of these two articles will show that the imperfection of an inchoative virtue and of a purely natural virtue in the supernatural order are quite different.

³⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, *ST*, II-II. 47. 13 et ad 2; 54. 1-3.

a science that it be so. Consequently, the dependence of the acquired moral virtues on the infused virtues and on charity does not make ethics a subalternated science.

CONCLUSION: CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The points made thus far may be summarized in the shape of an answer to this question, How, and in what sense, is ethics a science? According to the Thomist notion, a science is, in the strict and formal sense, a habit of knowledge (*a*) about a subject (*b*) from a distinctive or formal point of view, (*c*) with its own proper principles and (*d*) its own method or procedure. The subject of ethics may be expressed as human conduct or human actions. Is this field open to natural reason? It seems evident that it is. We have seen above that revelation introduces certain clarifications about the existential situation of man. But we have likewise concluded there that revelation (or faith, or theology) does not in the strict sense supply the subject matter for ethics.

The formal object of ethics is good and evil in human actions. Again, we must ask whether this formal consideration is open to natural reason. Obviously reason as distinct from faith cannot reach to the consideration of merit, of value for eternal life. Does this restriction leave any meaning to the concept of moral good? It does, as was indicated above. The ethician can clearly see that a morally good act is one which really leads to man's ultimate end. He can state this same relationship from another, a more attainable, point of view—namely, that a morally good act is one which conforms to the dictates of reason acting correctly and according to sufficient knowledge. He thus realizes that a morally good act is one whose object (in a wide sense) is good. Examining this object, the ethician finds that it contains an object (in the strict sense, that is, a thing or action), and end, and perhaps some circumstances. Having said that, he concludes that object, end, and circumstances must all three be good if the action is to be good. With these general conditions laid down, the remainder of the ethician's work is to examine various actions and things to see whether they are or are not in harmony with man's full human nature.

In this analysis, there are two things that are particularly pertinent to the present purpose. The first is the ultimate end; but this belongs to the principles of ethics and will be taken up formally in the third point. The second thing is the end of the agent. Now, it is quite true, as we have seen, that the ethician does not of himself know how man's will is rightly ordered. But this is a simple lack, an absence of knowledge, and nothing more. For though the ethician is ignorant of charity, he can proceed scientifically simply by saying, "One of the general condi-

tions of right action is that man's will be rightly ordered." And so ethics also fulfills the second requirement of a science.

The third requirement of a science is that it have its own proper principles. We have seen, in the discussion immediately preceding, that the principle of ethics is the ultimate end of man. Does ethics, as a habit of knowledge flowing from natural reason, know what the ultimate end of man is? Yes, it does; in the special and limited sense in which this was defined in the section entitled "Ethics and the End of Man." For natural reason can know that God is the end of man, or more fully, that the happiness and good of man is to be found in God. This, and only this, is the operative principle of ethics. Consequently, ethics fulfills the third requirement of a science.

The fourth requirement is that there be a proper method in a science. This proper method will be seen most definitely in the second movement of science, *secundum viam iudicii*. In this movement, the special characteristic of ethics is to procede from the *final* cause to the effects (means). With this fourth requirement of science there is no problem at all.

We therefore conclude that, on the one hand, ethics, or moral philosophy, is constituted as a science without being subalternated to theology. On the other hand, it is historically certain that it grew up in close dependence upon faith. There is historically a Christian ethics, and even an antireligious ethics. We can go further than this, and say that such dependence is not only a fact, but a necessity, and that this is principally because of the antinomy of the purely natural practical reason. We may qualify the relation as one of necessary extrinsic (or accidental) dependence.³⁵

Christian ethics may then be defined as that practical science of human action which even as a science recognizes its own insufficiency and the antinomy of its argument, and which is possessed by a philosopher who accepts the light of Christian faith and theology (*a*) to maintain his hold on the first principle of ethics and indirectly to clarify it; (*b*) to receive further understanding of the disorder found in man as he is; (*c*) to understand that the ultimate rectitude of the will necessary for prudence and for the goodness of individual actions is due to the infused virtue of charity; and (*d*) to admit that there are particular requirements which by his habit of ethics he cannot attain

³⁵ Compare the remark of St. Thomas in a quite different context: *Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa quae non assumuntur in scientia nisi ad alterius manifestationem non pertinent per se ad scientiam, sed quasi per accidens* (*In de Trin.*, 5. 4 ad 1 [ed. Wyser, p. 49]).

to, such as the divine positive law, the sacraments as necessary means to reach the end, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

And yet, even in principle, there are points of convergence between a Christian ethics and one constructed by an unbeliever; and these will be the more, the more the unbeliever can maintain himself in his situation of anguish. In specific details, there will be many more points of convergence. It has been said above that much of the effort of the ethicist consists in the examination of the specific moral character of certain situations and actions. His arguments at these points are drawn from proximate principles, namely, the order which reason sets up according to the measure of the order of reality. And so it is perfectly possible that two persons can discuss the living wage, the morality of modern economic practices, the desirability of a world government, and many similar topics, without ever explicitly adverting to the acceptance of the Christian revelation. It is because of this situation that there can be co-operation in the practical order among men of different principles; a co-operation of philosophers to achieve a world that is morally better³⁶ than the one we have today.

³⁶ "Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur: potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere" (*ST*, I-II. 109. 2, [Ottawa, 1353b]; cf. 4).

Cf. "Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum" (*ibid.*, II-II. 23. 7 [Ottawa 1527a]).

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

MAURICE BLONDEL,¹ THE DIALECTICIAN OF UNIVERSAL DYNAMISM

BLAISE ROMEYER, S.J.

Last November 2 the master entered his eighty-eighth year and is now finishing the dictation of the third and last book of his second trilogy, *La Philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*. It will be called *Crise de croissance et perspectives seules salutaires*. Just as in 1932 the *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (*Deux sources de la morale et de la religion*) crowned the philosophical work of Henri Bergson, so Blondelism will be completed by this last work. The time seems to have come for a comprehensive study on both *L'Action*, the trilogy of 1934-37, and on this other trilogy, which, begun in 1944 and continued through 1946, is now nearing completion. Here we shall set down the general direction of this latter work, which Blondel started to write in 1943, the year in which the author of this article published his *Philosophie religieuse de Maurice Blondel*.²

THE REVEREND BLAISE ROMEYER, S.J., a personal friend of Maurice Blondel, is the director of the Archives of Philosophie and professor of psychology and theodicy at the Jesuit seminary at Vals, France. He is the author of *Saint Thomas et notre connaissance de l'esprit humain*, *La Philosophie chrétienne jusqu'à Descartes*, and *La Philosophie religieuse de Maurice Blondel*.

¹ Maurice Blondel was born at Dijon on November 2, 1861, and after completing his secondary school training entered the École Normale there in 1881. Though he found there the infidel atmosphere which his parents had feared, yet he was able to adapt himself to it and make himself respected and loved. Two of his philosophy professors, Ollé-Laprune and Boutroux, possessed enough of the spiritual to aid him in their own respective ways to develop himself. He never forgot them. As *agrégé* in philosophy, M. Blondel taught in the *lycees* of Chaumont, Montauban, Aix-en-Provence, and finally at Stanislas College in Paris. On June 7, 1893, he defended at the Sorbonne his doctorate thesis. The principal part, called *L'Action*, was dedicated to Leon Ollé-Laprune, and the secondary part, entitled *De vinculo substantiali et de substantia composita apud Leibnitium* was dedicated to Émile Boutroux. After waiting two years, Blondel became *maître de conférences* at the University of Lille in 1895-96, then at the University of Aix-Marseille in 1896-97, where in the latter year he finally was named professor. There he was to fulfill his entire magnificent career in philosophy.

² Aubier (Paris, 1943).

When Blondel defended his thesis, *L'Action*, in 1893, M. Emile Boutroux closed his discussion with the candidate by approving his tendency to subordinate knowledge to action and by recognizing the success of his truly considerable effort.³

Today we are better able than the readers of the first *L'Action* to fix the precise meaning, as well as the universal scope and value of his work. Little by little—and not without struggle and the stimulating disquiet occasioned by criticism not always benevolent, much less understanding—Maurice Blondel sharpened his dialectical intuition. The testimony and results of this progressive growth are his various writings of the time, which are either new contributions, controversial works, or clarifications of preceding writings.⁴ Throughout all this, however, we easily recognize the same dialectician of 1893. What dialectical contributions are to be found in all these writings beginning with *L'Action*? Just this: instead of beginning with abstract concepts and attempting too easily to arrange these in a system, it is essential first to examine and analyse completely the whole of the human dynamism, and only then, after laying bare this phenomenology, to construct that synthesis which consists in pointing out the link of knowledge and action in being.⁵ This done, we have established the Blondelian prerequisites for the formation of a philosophical system aspiring to a critical and ontological value.

Many years passed before M. Blondel succeeded in drawing a philosophical trilogy from his method of analysis. Though he worked a long time, it was not until he was seventy-three years old that there appeared the two volumes of *La Pensée*, the first third of the trilogy. His point of departure is not an arrested thought, but rather the dynamism which supports, prepares, forms, increases it, submits it to choice, and renders it educative—a dynamism that cannot be complete naturally, but only supernaturally. Although M. Blondel is aware that thought lifted to the level of *act* is superior to the movement of progress toward act, he also understands, and explicitly says, that this is so only on condition that this act should live of the past which prepared and formed it and of the future which it opens up. Otherwise the concept in which it is fixed and the word which delivers it would be dead and deadening. Nothing is worse in the human order of understanding than such a conceptual sleep, or word-death. In order that the

³ *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, LVI (1907), 125.

⁴ In his excellent book *Philosophie de l'action*, (Paris: Aubier, 1948), pp. 117-213, M. Henry Duméry gives an exhaustive bibliography of these writings.

⁵ See our *Philosophie religieuse de Maurice Blondel*, (Paris: Aubier, 1943), pp. 89-105.

concept and the word be ever fit to express both the eternal and temporal truth that progressively are realized in beings and our knowledge of them, it is necessary that both be alive and constantly adapting themselves. This is the Blondelian dialectic of integral human thought, a dialectic in which are admirably set off both the incompleteness and progressiveness of truth at the human level and the unchangeable permanence or eternity characteristic of truth. Those universal principles which the Schoolmen call transcendental are for M. Blondel thought itself in so far as it seeks to know and justify itself—real truths which, since they are not integrally applicable to objects nor to the subject we experience within or without us, are invincibly affirmed as constitutive of an order of truths superior to, and at the same time necessary for, every empirical order.

Spontaneously we affirm these three points: there is a transcendental principle; this principle extends beyond the objects of our experience; and, when asserted, its objective value does not find its adequate application except in an ideal reality.⁶

In 1935, one year after *La Pensée* came out, appeared the one-volume work on *L'Être et les êtres*, the second part of the philosophical trilogy. In it, as in *La Pensée*, M. Blondel leaves the pertinent conceptual structure in the background. He proceeds directly to that naïve and even invincible *élan* called by Spinoza the fundamental tendency of every being to persevere in being, that tacit affirmation that a real drama is unfolding and that each one of us forms, with his own proper reality, a group made up of all we must undergo or produce, all that serves as either obstacle or instrument in reciprocal solidarity.⁷

What is "the being made up of beings"? It is that underlying substantial reality which must be reached and at the level of which a thing truly is and can and ought to be realized. This is an approximation, anyway, of M. Blondel's thought. It is this basis or substructure that a living ontology aims at in studying the conditions on which depends

⁶ "Mais sur le fond même d'où procède tout ce mouvement de la pensée, sur cette présence invisible et réelle d'un transcendant positif, sur le nom secret de cette vérité sans laquelle il n'y en aurait point d'autre, la philosophie contemporaine évite trop souvent toute précision. Raison de plus pour aborder de front ce problème auquel toutes nos investigations précédentes nous amènent par un progrès continu et incoercible" (*La Pensée* [Paris: Universitaires, 1934], I, 172-73).

⁷ "Comment les êtres peuvent-ils s'appeler ainsi, sinon dans la mesure où ils tendent à se mettre en équation avec toutes leurs virtualités et avec leur fin totale? Et l'on aperçoit aussi comment la donnée initiale est comme une provision de forces, un viatique destiné à permettre la genèse des êtres vers la fin où ils pourront se rattacher à leur principe et accomplir leur destinée, selon la fonction qu'à leur rang ils ont à remplir dans l'ordre universel" (*L'Être et les êtres* [Paris: Felix Alcan, 1935], pp. 10-11).

the consistence of beings in their relations with Him who alone deserves absolutely the title of being in and by Himself.⁸

No more than a St. Augustine or a St. Thomas Aquinas does M. Blondel dream of looking upon the "being of beings" without recognizing its essential relation to God, who is universal principle of beings and—in consequence of this—the creative final cause of the true, good, and beautiful in beings. Blondel's ontology, as his philosophy of thought, unfolds and reaches its perfection in a theodicy which of itself orientates and prepares us for the supernaturally gratuitous, though highly desirable, gift of being face to face with God, of glory, the full flowering of grace. Here is a manner of philosophizing which is worth many hours of thought. It is a dialectic which, setting out from an analysis of human dynamism, is lifted right out of the dynamism of the universe.⁹

A fortiori there is the same procedure not only in the second volume of the new *L'Action* (1937), which is a revised edition of the first, but also in the first volume of the same (1936)—the last third of the trilogy—where we find the prolegomena of a moral philosophy operative. Rising through inanimate causality to that of the human level, without arriving even here at the ideal summit of action, M. Blondel explains how and why the problem of pure action demands our positive examination and influences every solution of the metaphysical and moral question of action in all its breadth.¹⁰ Then, by solving ten progressive difficulties and by purifying with compensatory and stimulating negations various pairs of affirmations, he succeeds in building a theodicy of pure action. Finally he considers the problem of the addition of secondary causes to the first cause, which when resolved, allows the dialectician of universal dynamism to arrive at the end of his philosophical trilogy a complete religious philosopher.

Is dynamism still the characteristic of the Blondelian dialectic in *La Philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*, the new trilogy in which M. Blondel thinks Christianity itself? There is no doubt of this, if one is to judge

⁸ "C'est pour cela qu'au lieu de s'enfermer en des systèmes clos, en des succédanés conceptuels et toujours inadéquats, l'effort spéculatif et l'élan spirituel, constamment unis, ont pratiqué la méthode que déjà Platon nommait le voyage dialectique et la purification de l'âme, la méthode humble et confiante: *tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m'avais déjà trouvé*. Non, nous ne *chercherions* pas l'être, nous n'en aurions pas l'idée, nous n'aurions même aucune idée, si nous ne *l'avions* ou ne *l'étions* en quelque façon" (*ibid.*, pp. 11-12).

⁹ "Si réellement nous sommes des êtres, en quel sens, à quel prix, sous quelles conditions est-ce possible? Quelle est notre maîtrise, quelle est notre dépendance, quelles peuvent être nos obligations et nos responsabilités à l'égard des autres êtres, de nous-même, de l'idée inévitable d'un Etre en soi?" (*ibid.*, p. 13).

¹⁰ *L'Action*, I, 114.

by the first two volumes, which appeared in 1944 and in 1946. Leaving to professional theologians the task of establishing the divine value of the Christian religion and of organizing its content of truth and life, our philosopher, as a practical and believing Catholic, is content to unfold its vital and luminous harmonies by taking account of what is known by natural reason alone. M. Blondel, who, since the *L'Action* of 1893, had familiarized himself with St. Augustine, followed in this a good guide, for is it not in meditating on the human soul as image of the one and triune God that this father of the Church marked the precise point where philosophy and theology meet, help one another, and are unified?¹¹

By taking account of the immense movement in modern thought, M. Blondel has in his own way shown how philosophy is a sort of baptism by water, a preparation for the final glory, and how it raises many legitimate problems which itself cannot completely resolve.¹²

M. Blondel, the dialectician of universal dynamism in the natural order, is also the dialectician of Christian dynamism.

CHRONICLE

THE SAINT LOUIS CHAPTER of the International Society for General Semantics has been formed, with the following officers for 1949-50: Mr. John J. Kessler, president; Mrs. Thelma Wiles Thalinger (Route 2, Chesterfield, Mo.) secretary; and Mr. J. R. Oxenhandler, treasurer.

MR. LEWIS EDWIN HAHN, formerly of the University of Missouri, came to Washington University (Saint Louis) in September as head of the Department of Philosophy. He succeeds Mr. Charles E. Cory, who has retired from that position.

PROFESSOR JAMES C. SPALDING joined the faculty of Missouri Valley College in February. Professor Spalding is a graduate of the University of Illinois and of Hartford Theological Seminary. He also spent eighteen months studying at Zurich, Basle, and Tübingen.

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS of the United States have begun "a Thomistic review of spiritual theology" directed to "all who value the interior life." *Cross and Crown* is edited by the Very Reverend John L. Callahan, O.P. Yearly subscription, \$4.00.

THE GOETHE BICENTENNIAL FOUNDATION sponsored an international Goethe Convocation and Music Festival at Aspen, Colorado, from June

¹¹ Cf. I. C. Boyer, "L'image de la Trinité, synthèse de la pensée augustinienne," *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), 173-99, 333-52.

¹² Cf. *La Philosophie de l'esprit chrétien* (Paris: Universitaires, 1944), I, 13.

27 to July 16. Many scholars and literary men were invited to participate, among them Albert Schweitzer, José Ortega y Gasset, Robert Hutchins, and Gerardus van der Leeuw. Topics to be discussed included "The Crisis of Contemporary Civilization in the Light of Goethe's Work," "Goethe's Social Thought and the Modern World," "Classical German Thought, the Humanities, and the Western World," and "World Literature's Social Function." The Foundation has arranged for an English translation of the most important of Goethe's works. It will be published in ten volumes, the first of which is to be issued in June.

FRENCH CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS held their annual "Week" of meetings and lectures from May 10 to May 15 in Paris. The theme this year was "Faith in Jesus Christ and the World of Today." Jacques Maritain delivered the opening lecture. Paul Claudel acted as chairman of the session on "Faith and Freedom of Art and Literature," which attracted a large audience. François Mauriac, Etienne Gilson, and Emmanuel Mounier were among the speakers.

THE UNION MONDIALE DES SOCIÉTÉS CATHOLIQUES DE PHILOSOPHIE held a general constitutive assembly at Fribourg (Switzerland) on September 17. This assembly was to adopt the statutes and form the organization of the World Union, and initiate the steps necessary to enter the International Federation of Societies of Philosophy. The secretariate of the World Union has arranged to keep in contact with the Mouvement International des Intellectuels Catholiques (*Pax Romana*), which has established a philosophical secretariate of three members, of whom Professor Emile Marmy of Fribourg is one.

ON THE OCCASION of the fifth centenary of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Istituto di Studi Filosofici of Rome, in collaboration with the Centre Italo-Français d'Études sur l'Humanisme of Paris, organized an international congress of humanistic studies, whose theme was humanism and political science. This was divided into three secondary themes, (a) humanism and Machiavellism; (b) common law and the new currents of public law in the period of the Renaissance; and (c) man and society, humanism and the problem of speech, and the value of testimony. The meetings were held from September 24 to September 27 in Rome, and from September 28 to September 30 in Florence.

SEVERAL NEW PHILOSOPHICAL journals have appeared in Germany. In 1948 W. Eucken and Fr. Böhm founded *Ordo*, whose articles are concerned with the ordering of society. In 1949, O. F. Bollnow and others introduced the quarterly journal *Philosophische Studien*, printed by De Gruyter in Berlin. Also in 1949 E. Schmitt and T. Pippin began *Archiv für Ostasien*, printed by Bastian Verlag, in Düsseldorf. Since

1948 H. Fritsche has edited *Merlin*, printed by Axel Springer in Hamburg.

A GERMAN EDITION of the works of Soloviev is in preparation, under the editorship of H. Szyllkarski. It will be published at the rate of two or three volumes a year by Erich Wewel, Kraling vor München.

IMPORTANT BOOKS recently published in Germany are the following: Ballauf, Theodor. *Das gnoseologische Problem*. [The first volume of "Grundlegende Texte zur philosophische Problematik."] Göttingen, 1949. Pp. 203.

Becher, Erich. *Einführung in die Philosophie*. Berlin-München: Duncker und Humbolt, 1949.

Brecht, Fr. J. *Einführung in die Philosophie der Existenz*. Heidelberg: 1948.

Buber, Martin. *Das Problem des Menschen*. Heidelberg: Schneider, 1948. Pp. 169.

Freytag-Loeringhoff. *Zur Philosophie der Mathematik*. Meisenheim: Westkulturverlag, 1948. Pp. 60.

Hartmann, Nikolai. *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1949.

Heidegger, Martin. *Über den Humanismus*. Frankfurt am Main, 1949.

———. *Was ist Metaphysik?* [With a new Introduction, and some changes.] Frankfurt, 1949.

Heussner, Alfred. *Die philosophische Weltanschauungen und ihre Hauptvertreter*. Ed. by Gerda von Bredow. Göttingen, 1949.

Jünger, Fr. G. *Nietzsche*. Frankfurt am Main, 1949.

Landgrebe, L. *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik*. Hamburg, 1949. Pp. 208.

Leisegang, Hans. *Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard*. Berlin, 1948. Pp. 41.

May, Eduard. *Kleiner Grundriss der Naturphilosophie*. Meisenheim, 1949. Pp. 112.

Meinertz, Jos. *Moderne Seinsprobleme in ihrer Bedeutung für die Psychologie*. Heidelberg, 1948.

Mitterer, Albert. *Elterschaft und Gattenschaft nach dem Weltbild des hl. Thomas von Aquin und dem der Genenwart*. Vienna: Herder, 1949. Pp. 160. \$3.14.

Noll, Balduin. *Der philosophische Mensch in der Entscheidung der Zeit*. Meisenheim, 1949.

Pfeil, Hans. *Fr. Nietzsche und die Religion*. Regensburg, 1948.

———. *Grundfragen der Philosophie im Denken der Gegenwart*. Paderborn, 1949.

Philosophen-Lexikon, A-K. Ed. by W. Ziegenfuss. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1949.

- Pohlenz, Max. *Die Stoa*. 2 volumes. Göttingen, 1949.
- Schneider, Fr. *Kennen und Erkennen*. Gütersloh, 1949. Pp. 560.
- Siegmund, Georg. *Nietzsche der Atheist und Antichrist*. Paderborn, 1948.
- Well, Alfons, O.P. *Die Funktion des Thomismus in der neueren Theologie*. "Kleine Texte zu Theologie und Seelsorge," No. 2. Vienna: Herder, 1948. Pp. 36. 24¢
- Weymann-Weyhe, Walter. *Die Entscheidung des Menschen*. Nietzsche als geschichtliche Wirklichkeit. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1948.
- Zucker, K. *Psychologie des Aberglaubens*. Heidelberg, 1948.

BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHOLOGIE REFLEXIVE. By André Marc, S.J. 2 Vols. Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1949. Vol. I, pp. 382; Vol. II, pp. 422.

When depth of understanding and breadth of information and sympathy are found so strikingly united in one, a reviewer does not need the gift of prophecy to hail *Psychologie réflexive* as a classic. Yet elaborate praise is superfluous; what is due to such a work is rather careful reading and honest thought.

As far as the subject matter of *Psychologie réflexive* is concerned, it is a rational psychology (Vol. II, pp. 401-4). Yet it contains both more and less than is ordinarily contained in philosophical psychology. It deals only with the conscious life of man (and it is not alone in making this restriction), so that the vegetative life even of man is not explicitly treated, although some things are said about it by way of contrast or comparison. In addition to this, there is no explicit treatment of sense appetency, though this comes up by way of comparison and contrast with the will. On the other hand, the treatment of knowledge bears largely on what would be called by others the metaphysics of knowledge, or epistemology.

The method used is called "reflection" or reflective analysis (Vol. II, pp. 403-8), or deduction (*passim*, e.g., Vol. I, pp. 166, 260). Father Marc insists with good reason that he is not proceeding a priori, as if he would derive reality from a concept. He begins with a fact, an act, and in that act he discovers its nature, its principles, its conditions. In this the method is consciously like that of Father Maréchal in *Le Point de départ*.

What is most characteristic and impressive about this reflection is that it is carried on by means of the thoughts of other philosophers. The cast of characters of this symposium is highly interesting. The majority of the interlocutors are post-Kantians in one sense or another, and in this skilful and far-ranging employment of modern problems and modern solutions Father Marc shows the vitality and actuality of his own thought. Most prominent of all the authors quoted and used is Kant, prominent in the sense that he appears most frequently and at greatest length. In a sense, however, the principal voice among all these is that of St. Thomas. Father Marc shows time and time again

that the "persistent problems of philosophy" are the problems of St. Thomas, too; that his principles and solutions are used implicitly and partially by many who ignore him or are even opposed; and that these same principles and solutions are found in the reflexive analysis itself.

In this, Father Marc's work deserves special commendation. There is no doubt that a philosophy, to be really such, must face real problems; to be permanently valuable, it must face the ever-recurring problems of life and thought. That St. Thomas's thought is truly philosophical in this sense is inescapably demonstrated here. Moreover, a philosophy is adequate to the extent that it touches the complexity of the real. Such adequacy is best shown (and perhaps uniquely shown) in that a philosopher can assimilate the partial insights of all his predecessors and contemporaries. This means that he must have a position from which he can show that all other insights are precisely partial, and a method by which he can point out and explain the errors of others. And this must be shown in practice, not merely asserted in principle. It is for this reason that Thomists must do the kind of work that is done here, if they wish the thought of St. Thomas to be widely accepted.

Psychologie réflexive is divided into three parts or books. Part I deals with knowledge, Part II with will, Part III with the "spirit," or soul. In the treatment of the will, Father Marc discusses its existence, liberty, the free act, the destiny of liberty, and habit. Particularly fine in this section are the treatments of the relations between intellect and will, and of the nature of the free act. The study of the soul includes a discussion of its reality and nature, the human composite, and the relation between person and individual.

The first book, on knowledge, occupies the whole first volume. In addition to being the most extensive, it is also the most original, and entails certain points which seem to need some discussion.

The fact with which Father Marc begins his discussion of knowledge is the fact of language (in the wide sense—as including not only voice, but the language of gesture). A modern analysis is used, and the significance of the fact is sharpened by the instance of Marie Heurtin, the French Helen Keller. Language is discovered to be the sensible sign of intelligence, the unity of the sensible and the intelligible. It is through such signs that the human mind progresses, that the human person acquires control of himself and the things around him. Emphasis upon this function of sign seems to be occasionally excessive, so that not only the progress, but the beginning of objective thought is laid to the sign (Vol. I, pp. 24-26). This would be true, if the discussion centered on the mental word and particularly on the judgment; the object of discussion seems to be language as spoken, imagined, gesticu-

lated. In the course of the discussion of language, attention is paid to the Scholastic analysis of the sign. Here it is stated that this analysis is in the main a logical one. Father B. J. Lonergan, S.J., in an article in *Theological Studies* (Vol. VII; September, 1946), rightly insists and conclusively shows that there is a large amount of introspective psychological analysis in the Thomist account of these matters. It is to be regretted that St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias* is so little noticed.

A second point of discussion concerns sense perception. Following Kant in his statement of the problem and partly in its solution, Father Marc speaks of a synthesis of space by means of time (Vol. I, pp. 98-110). I have never been able to verify this process in my own experience. The sensory synthesis actively made by the sensing subject seems to be not so much a fact of experience as a conclusion based on the Kantian (and ultimately Platonic) supposition of the unordered and unintelligible nature of matter. The Gestalt psychologists have proved that the active syntheses of the sensing subject are neither as numerous nor as all-pervasive and constitutive as has been supposed by Kant and other Platonists. The Kantian subjective unifying factors (forms and categories) seem to oscillate uneasily between being inherent in phenomena and transcendent in the transcendental subject. The Kantian problem at the level of sensation and sense perception is not a single but a multiple problem. The pure (imagined) form of space is partially constitutive of adult sense perception, but it is based on the prior given common sensibles of extension and shape. Hence sense knowledge needs to be examined at two levels: a prior moment in which common and proper sensibles are given in external sensation only as united, and a later moment in which the common sensibles are separated in the imagination (cf. *De Veritate*, 15. 2) and as such enter into the constitution of sense perception as unifying forms.

Another part of Father Marc's discussion of sense knowledge consists in an attempt to arrange in a philosophical order the different kinds of external sensations. The doctrine at this point is drawn almost entirely from modern authors; it is rather deeply metaphorical and fails to be either clear or convincing. It is very difficult to show from the very nature of sense knowledge that there must be just the number and kind of senses that man has. Some necessity can be shown in a general sort of way, as St. Thomas does in the *Summa*. A demonstration that goes into greater detail seems to discover a necessity by the device of surreptitiously restating the fact.

A third point of discussion concerns the relation of self-consciousness to knowledge. When dealing with the knowledge of the self, of potencies,

habits, and acts, Father Marc says and proves that the human intellect is such a power that it must first know something other than itself before it knows itself. But at other times (e.g., Vol. I, pp. 65-68, 88, 184-85) it is said that self-consciousness is the condition of knowledge. Now, it is true that in the order of perfection and finality (*in ordine formae et finis*) self-consciousness is prior to other knowledge; it is not true in the order of time and efficiency. Moreover, it can be granted that intellectual knowledge can be had only by a power which is capable of self-consciousness. Such distinctions, of course, are to be understood; but unless they are actually made, it seems that a misunderstanding can easily take place.

A fourth point concerns the objectification of knowledge. In one sense this is the main Kantian problem of intellectual knowledge. In another sense, it is an Aristotelian problem, too. In Aristotelian terms, to know is "to become the other as other." This implies both a union and a distinction of the knower and that which is known. Father Marc attacks this problem in two stages: the mental word and the double (Kantian) term "understanding—reason." The problem seems to be placed first in its entirety in Volume I, pages 259-63. Perhaps this is necessary, but it caused some confusion to this reviewer. In the first reading, and even upon rereading, some things that are said about the mental word seem to belong to the judgment. This seems to be indicated by the author himself (p. 276), and yet it is not satisfactorily said. A suspicion remains that the difficulty here is the acceptance of the Kantian distinction between the understanding (as faculty of phenomena) and the reason (as faculty of the absolute).

Father Marc admits that the problem of the understanding and the reason is expressed in those terms only since Kant (p. 291). Yet he insists at the same time that there is in that problem a permanently valuable problem, and that it has been treated, though in other terms, ever since Plato and Aristotle. There is no difficulty in granting to Father Marc that Kant has in some way come to grips with a problem. The question is, Is there one problem or several problems? and has it (or they) been rightly located? It seems that hidden behind the single distinction made by Kant there are really several—between abstract and concrete knowledge, between science and philosophy, between speculative and practical knowledge, and between apprehension and judgment. Father Marc seems to imply as much when he handles most of these problems in successive sections.

The crux of the Kantian problem is reached in the three ideas of reason, treated by Father Marc under their general aspect of being "ideas of the unconditioned." In the course of this discussion, Father

Marc works through the idea of being and the judgment to the act of existing, *esse*. It is in the proportion of the essence to its absolute and ultimate act of existing, and in the judgment which affirms an essence to be, that Father Marc finds the unconditioned which Kant was looking for in vain (pp. 329-36). In this resolution of the problem, the position of Father Maréchal is corrected and surpassed by what seems to be both a more rigorous and yet a brilliantly original application of Father Maréchal's own method. After the obscurities referred to above, these seven pages are masterly and satisfying.

There are several minor points which it seems need some reworking, such as the treatment of "schematism" (pp. 250-58), the relation of which to intellect is not altogether clear, and the involvement of the mental word with the imagined (vocal or motor) word (p. 276).

These points of disagreement and discussion are not meant to be reflections upon the philosophical ability of Father Marc nor upon the brilliance of his synthesis of Thomistic and modern thought. It is because of the intrinsic, great value of *Psychologie réflexive* that this *Auseinandersetzung* has been undertaken, with the hope that both Thomist and modern philosophers will profit more from a study of it, and that some American Thomist will do a similar work with an eye to the influences that have molded American thought outside of Thomistic circles.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNST CASSIRER. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Evanston, Ill.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949. Pp. xviii + 936. \$6.00.

I.

This is the sixth volume in the well-known series, "The Library of Living Philosophers," edited by Professor Schilpp. At the time of Ernst Cassirer's death in 1945, this project was well under way and fortunately was not abandoned. It adheres to the same general pattern set in the earlier volumes, although Cassirer's death seriously interfered with the plan. He did not live to supply either a biographical sketch of himself or a point-by-point reply to his critics. Despite this handicap, the book upholds the high standards of scholarship and philosophical discussion which have made this "Library" so notable an undertaking.

The four sections of the book provide biographical material, descriptive and critical essays, the author's own statement, and a bibliography. Under the first heading are included two biographical essays by associates of Cassirer, together with a group of brief commemorative

addresses delivered at Columbia University shortly after Cassirer's death. In the third section is printed an English translation of an essay by Cassirer on "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy" (published originally in 1930). This represents his attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the idealist and vitalist lines of thought in modern Germany. Such an irenic purpose is typical of his entire career, although it is equally characteristic that this reconciliation is effected through an idealist reinterpretation of the meaning of life.

The bibliography is a most valuable feature of the book, since it gives a complete listing of Cassirer's numerous books, articles, and major book reviews. His writings began with a study of Descartes's scientific thought (1899), reached a peak in his studies on *The Problem of Knowledge* and the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, and continued in an uninterrupted stream until his death. Two books and several articles were printed posthumously. Students of philosophy are awaiting the imminent publication of the long-delayed fourth volume of *Das Erkenntnisproblem*. From the table of contents supplied here, it appears that this final volume will cover nineteenth-century epistemological trends under three headings: exact science (mathematics and physics), the noetic ideal of biology and its transformations (idealistic morphology, evolutionism, vitalism), and basic forms and trends of historical knowledge (historicism, positivism, history from the standpoint of politics, culture, psychology, and religion). This table of contents raises the hope that Cassirer will at last come to grips with the problem of the scientific status of the nonmathematical sciences. On the other hand, it is disappointing to find that he continued to ignore the economic interpretation of history and the special difficulties it raises for an idealist thinker.

It will be good news to many students, unable to consult the German text, to learn that English translations are being prepared of the following books: *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, *Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics*, and the fourth volume of *Das Erkenntnisproblem*. But Cassirer's thought will continue to be only imperfectly known to most American readers until the earlier volumes of *Das Erkenntnisproblem* and the three-volume *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* are rendered into English. Only a partial and unbalanced understanding can be acquired from the books now available in English.

II.

The major portion of *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer* is devoted to critical and descriptive essays by competent scholars. Practically all the aspects of Cassirer's mind are examined in these twenty-three papers. Their range includes his conception of philosophy, metaphysics, and

science; his theory of symbolic forms, language, and myth; his humanism, philosophy of culture, and theories of art and literature; his historical method and his attitude toward neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. There is some overlapping among these papers, especially in the field of language, myth, and literature, although this is perhaps unavoidable. But the long-winded comparative disquisition by David Bidney could have been excised without seriously impairing our knowledge of Cassirer. David Baumgardt's discussion of Cassirer's ethics is also more revealing of the author's interests in Bentham and G. E. Moore than of the immediate subject; but in this instance the remoteness is due more to the thinness of Cassirer's own moral speculations. Significantly, only scattered references are made to Cassirer's opinions on religion. The scientific and aesthetic interpretations of the world engaged most of his attention.

Two noteworthy issues are clarified, Cassirer's way of treating history and his relations to the Kantian tradition. His aim in historical writing was not to give an empirical, concrete account of the situation, but to capture the spirit of a philosophy or an age as seen from his own theoretical standpoint. Because of his wide erudition and generous temperament, he was able to infuse the breath of life into his argument. But it would be fatal for a reader to neglect the fact that a definite thesis is being promoted by a selective handling of the materials. Cassirer's plastic genius is exhibited not only in his style, but also in his historical outlook. This is pointed out in the essays by J. H. Randall and Walter Solmitz.

Randall shows how, for instance, Cassirer's attempt to be a "retrospective prophet" results in a foreshortened appraisal of the Renaissance period. Seeking historical confirmation of his own conviction about the utter autonomy and creativity of the mind, Cassirer was led to stress the revolutionary side of the Renaissance at the expense of factors of continuity. Hence he pays little attention to the Aristotelian currents and treats the medieval past merely as a foil for his heroes. This theoretical preoccupation also forces him to misstate the relation between authority and reason in the pre-Renaissance world and to make out of Galileo a remarkably prescient forerunner of Kantianism. Taking Cassirer's treatment of Galileo as representative of his historical method, Solmitz concludes:

Either Cassirer agrees with Galileo and then speaks 'through' Galileo, somewhat like a dramatist speaks through a historical character; or else he disagrees with him and then he makes Galileo the object of his comprehensive and extremely liberal understanding in such a

manner that even where Galileo seems to 'disagree' he is also made to 'express' the truth—in a different tongue.

Solmitz admits that the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist is sometimes very finely drawn; but he is sure that Cassirer can be placed at least among the "good sophists." In any case, it is well to bear in mind that Cassirer wrote philosophical history somewhat as Thomas Mann wrote the history of Joseph or as Goethe wrote the history of Goetz von Berlichingen.

W. H. Werkmeister, who has elsewhere approached the philosophy of science from a Kantian standpoint, here examines Cassirer's relation to neo-Kantianism. In his later years, Cassirer was somewhat irked at the automatic classification of his philosophy with the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Although he had been an enthusiastic student of Hermann Cohen, his own research carried him beyond the positions established by Cohen and Natorp. Werkmeister's aim, however, is to show that—at least in the philosophy of science—Cassirer does not so much oppose as extend the common fund of doctrine. It is often complacently remarked that the advent of non-Euclidean geometry and the general theory of relativity have spelled the doom of Kant's transcendental logic. It was left for Cassirer to accept this challenge; and Werkmeister's contention is that Cassirer broadened the groundwork of Kantianism sufficiently to take account of the new scientific advances without upsetting the original premises. I agree with Werkmeister that a fairly adequate explanation of recent mathematical physics can be given within a Kantian framework. It seems to me that the most vulnerable portion of such a restatement is the need to invoke an *a priori* factor from the Kantian standpoint, whereas the views of the mathematical physicists can be explained without invoking this cornerstone of Kantian idealism. But there is no easy route open for refuting the Kantian postulates merely by pointing to the rise of conceptions which were not envisaged by Newtonian physics and its mathematical basis. The evaluation of Kant and his intellectual descendants must still be undertaken on a properly philosophical terrain.

Some hints toward such a criticism are furnished by two pairs of essays in the present symposium. The contributions of W. C. Swabey and Wilbur Urban show a close affinity, as do those of Helmut Kuhn and Fritz Kaufmann. The two former scholars are concerned about metaphysical issues, whereas the latter concentrate upon humanistic and religious problems raised by Cassirer's stand.

Although he often discussed and illustrated Kant's Copernican revolution, Cassirer never subjected it to radical questioning. Kant's

"deed" was truly the beginning of wisdom for him, and he considered his own task to be the universalization of the Kantian critique. Whereas Kant held that the logic of science reveals the basic structure of the mind, Cassirer pushed the transcendental activity of mind back to characteristically prescientific and nonscientific modes of thinking and feeling. The mythical and artistic outlooks were shown to require an a priori constitution of a distinctive world of symbolic forms. Cassirer stated this broadened Kantian premise in innumerable ways throughout his works. Law holds the primacy over thing; the schemata do not borrow from the empirical world, but create their own support; the mind's attitude, not an independent logic, produces the a priori; to apprehend is to establish, inform, relate, determine; men do not deal with things but converse with themselves; we know not objects, but objectively, by supplying our own objects; the *datum* is a *creatum*; there is no pure being or experience unmixed with mind's shaping power. In a word, the objective world is that which is fashioned by *homo creator*, by man as a creative *animal symbola formans*. All of Cassirer's historical research is intended to support this supposition, and his own philosophy of symbolic forms is a universal application of it. Man's development consists in increasing his sovereign freedom over the "materials of experience" (a phrase which is no more clarified by Cassirer than is "the matter of sensibility" by Kant). There is a dialectical ascent from the symbolic creations of primitive, mythical, and religious intelligence to the artistic production, and finally to the mathematical use of "purified" signs in the scientific universe.

What troubles Swabey and Urban in this doctrine is the fate of truth and nonscientific forms of cognition. Cassirer provides his philosophy with apparent empirical vitality by fusing Kant's transcendental logic with Hegel's conception of phenomenology. But he has not escaped the difficulties which confronted his predecessors. In a wholly immanent view of cognition, truth can be determined only by appeal to consistency and inner laws of development (dynamic consistency). There is a danger of sanctioning every cultural manifestation simply because the philosopher can find a place for it in a scheme of dialectical growth. This can issue in an "idolization of the cultural process," although Cassirer strove to avoid this outcome. But he could not prevent this leveling process by appealing to decisive differences between the true and the false, the good and the evil. For such a procedure would lead back to realism. Consequently, Cassirer had no other recourse than to maintain the subordination of truth to meaning, of actuality to symbolic ordering by an integrating mind. The primacy of meaning agreed with his placement of mathematics as the prototypal science, whereas the

primacy of productive symbols harmonized with his conception of knowledge as a making operation. But this solution does not escape the original defect of arbitrariness and leveling. For it is left to aesthetic fitness to determine which theory conveys maximal meaning and which cultural pattern permits the most humane living.

If truth is still allowed a place, it finds proper expression in scientific propositions. Here a twofold question may be posed. How ascertain truth within the scientific field, and how integrate other forms of cognition with scientific knowledge? Cassirer provides no unequivocal replies to these difficulties. His idealistic method enables him to arrange past scientific achievements in logical order, but it does not provide a method for making scientific progress in the present situation. A purely historico-analytic view of science is orientated toward the past: it enables men not to make discoveries, but to celebrate the discoveries which have been made. Idealism steers clear of concrete historical causation, since the latter reveals the finiteness and dependence of the mind as well as its activity. Cassirer's standpoint revels in the moments of creative break with an accepted theory; but its failure to provide a way of distinguishing between the spirit of an age and reliable knowledge prevents it from assuming a similarly creative role with regard to the present.

In regard to mythico-religious and artistic symbols, Cassirer does not grant them the status of knowledge, even though he does not rule them out from a total human attitude. Philosophies and religions elaborated under the aegis of belief in a transcendental being and in substances must be radically transformed and elevated before they can take their place in the final stage of Cassirer's harmonious constellation of forms. At this point he takes advantage of the ambiguity in Hegel's notion of *Aufhebung*. It is impossible for the reader to determine the exact nature of the modification required of these lower kinds of symbols, if their content is to survive.

One thing seems certain, nevertheless, to Kuhn and Kaufmann: the finite, individual man and his ordinary experience have little standing in the universe of symbolic forms. His sense of finitude, anguish, and temporality is harried by the charge of surrendering the treasure of human autonomy. His troubled questions about death, personal relations, socio-economic pressure, and irrevocable moral choice are given no serious hearing. His confession of the inadequacy of his being, as before God, is interpreted as an inadequacy of his symbol of God. He is told that this symbol is only an expression of his own nature and is elaborated only so that he can come to know himself. The long-range advice is to overcome the relatively primitive sphere of religious symbols,

so as to enter into the kingdom of light and serenity. When the finite person tries to relate himself to the universe of symbolic forms, however, he finds himself just as much a stranger to this world of creative *Geist* as was the Parmenidean observer to the great sphere of being. Instead of charging the philosophy of substance and transcendent being with alienating man from the world, Cassirer should have noted that such estrangement is the inevitable penalty of accepting his own creative idealism.

III.

At the conclusion of my review of the previous volume in this "Library" (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXII (1945), 112), I remarked on the absence of studies by representatives of Scholasticism and Christian philosophy in general. This defect has been remedied to a degree in the present work, since at least one paper examines Cassirer from a Christian standpoint. But there is one Cassirerean theme which is not stressed here, but which might have been assigned to someone with such interests. I mean the bitter polemic which Cassirer waged against the Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics. Both historically and theoretically, his views on the older doctrines of substance, causality, reason, and freedom stand in need of a critical overhauling. Like Léon Brunschvicg, he permitted his sense of proportion and conscientious study of the texts to desert him whenever he had to deal with the Aristotelian and Christian traditions. The myth of the progress of consciousness which both these thinkers propounded, served as a handy but nonphilosophical way of dismissing precisely that conception of reality which stubbornly resists inclusion in an idealist setting. The honorific term "mature" is no more self-evidently the property of Kantian idealism than is the pejorative term "primitive-mythical" reserved for realism. This issue would have been worthy of a special investigation.

Professor Schilpp announces that one future volume in this "Library" will deal with the philosophy of Karl Jaspers. In this case, it is inconceivable that the problem of his relation to Christianity and, more specifically, to Catholicism should not be given separate treatment. In the works published after his *Philosophie*, Jaspers had been increasingly concerned with this question. In *Der philosophische Glaube* and *Von der Wahrheit*, he is at great pains to underline his radical opposition to the "catholic" attitude, which he finds best exemplified in Catholicism, although not limited to it. It is reasonable to hope, then, that some Catholic philosopher who has distinguished himself in the field of Jaspers studies will be invited to participate in the undertaking. There

comes to mind at once the name of the current Gifford lecturer, Gabriel Marcel.

JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis University

ARISTOTE EN OCCIDENT. LES ORIGINES DE L'ARISTOTELISME PARISIEN. By F. Van Steenberghen. Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Pp. 200.

Chapter 2 of Father Van Steenberghen's study *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* ("Les Philosophes Belges," XII, 1931) is here reprinted with little change. The background and development of Latin philosophy in the early thirteenth century are sketched rapidly. Of course, the main story is the rediscovery of the major works of Aristotle, the efforts to use something of the science and philosophy of Aristotelianism at Paris, the attitudes of SS. Albert, Bonaventure, and Thomas to this pagan philosophy. Even though brief, this study is more reliable than the much-discussed work of M. M. Gorce, *L'essor de la pensée au moyen-âge* (Paris, 1933). However, there are two chief objections to the present reprint. It omits most of the original footnotes and has no bibliography; as a result, many of the secondary works under discussion are not identified clearly. For instance (p. 49), mention is made of a study on Averroism by the late M. Grabmann, but the title is not given. This is an annoying defect. Secondly, little attention is paid to publications of the past fifteen years. So rapidly do medieval studies now move, that this reprint is already dated. Instead of being published in 1946, it should have been delayed a year or two and brought up to date. Omission of an index of names and terms is inexcusable in a work of this character.

VERNON J. BOURKE

Saint Louis University

THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIAL CASE WORK. By Mary J. McCormick. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 148. \$2.00.

It is a truly remarkable feat to deal with "a reality that is capable of integrating and directing its own forces in a way that is different from that of every other individual nature" and to omit telling us how this is to be accomplished in fact.

Yet Mary J. McCormick manages to do that. She leaves out of explicit consideration the fact and the operation of the virtues. She thus leaves out of consideration the one thing with which social case work is most interested, namely, the possibility within the individual

of co-operating with the help of the case worker and thus effecting that dynamic organization of life which is the aim of all good social case work.

No one can "scientifically" assist another unless he has clear enough in mind the processes through which that other must go in order to achieve the success desired for him and, so it is to be hoped, nascently desired by himself. Yet Mary J. McCormick seems to want us to think that "the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas" gives us only an abstract teaching on what man is (with a very doubtful account of what "the free judgment of the reason" may be) in chapter 1 of her book; and a fairly intelligible account of "the passions" in chapter 2. But she fails to recognize the active element in human beings—the capacity for, and the means of, and the way of, the formation of truly virtuous action in man. This is so vital to the Scholastic system that to omit it is to fail to identify that system.

In the chapters which follow on the first part of the book—in chapters 1 and 2, that is—she attempts to show the standard techniques of social case work as influenced by her previous account of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. It is not worth while noting those chapters inasmuch as the two key chapters, the two which give the *raison d'être* of the book, seem so inadequate. If you are going to tell me how Aquinas views man as an individual who can be assisted when in trouble, you had better tell me what it is in man which enables him, as man, to react personally and on his own initiative to the stimuli which I can bring to bear on him. Mary J. McCormick apparently attempts to make man an object of the case worker's solicitude and influence, but strips man of the fundamental capacity for forming character within himself and for himself. The author insists on the passive elements in man—the passions—and seems unaware of the active elements with which man can accomplish his own reformation. Perhaps she is so taken by the current concepts in social case work literature of man as an object of "scientific study" that she cannot get around to the fact that man is not able to be made the object of scientific study since man has the free judgment of the reason. By reason of this endowment he can orient himself, he can elect to work rationally toward the formation of character, toward the formation of good habits, toward the formation of the integrated and wholesome child of God and heir of heaven with the beatific vision as his last end.

Anyway, it is not of much use to us to see the author's treatment of the person and the significance of emotion (chaps. 1 and 2) when we are left with the impression that this "person" is after all just another one of those "objects" which science elects to study and for which science prescribes. You cannot treat of that which is man with any

efficiency unless you show us how man works and with what processes man can accomplish his noble objectives. You cannot tell us how man is to be viewed by the social case worker, pretending to give the teachings of Thomistic philosophy, unless you give us technically the virtues, unless you give us really the means and methods of man's formation of character, of man's self-chosen achievement of his necessary goals. And, when Mary J. McCormick leaves out the virtues, she leaves out those unomittable things.

The preface is sound and clear in its commitments. The rest of the work is neither sound nor clear in its theory. It cannot be of much use, then, in helping to an understanding of Thomistic philosophy in social case work.

I am inclined to judge that the author's basic difficulty is the notion in her own mind that Thomistic philosophy can be shown to fit into the already determined "deterministic" philosophy of social case work. But you cannot fit a live entity into an artificial and dead form. I am afraid that, along with various other Catholics, Miss McCormick is attempting to win a hearing for the Catholic teachings on man and man's place in the world and man's essential destiny by showing the impossible—that is, by showing that Thomistic philosophy can talk the language of modern social case work, can be made at home within the framework of modern social case work. That, of course, cannot be done.

Catholics ought to realize and glory in the fact that they have the correct account of what man is, why man has dignity, and whither man is bound to go here on earth as a member of society and eventually in eternity. But Catholics are hardly going to be helped by Miss McCormick's book. And non-Catholics are not going to find a true account of Thomistic philosophy in it. Whether Catholics care to boast of it or not, they are engaged in the corporal and spiritual works of mercy when they undertake social case work. Whether Catholics acknowledge it or not, they are, when engaged in social case work, helping individuals gain their eternal happiness, or are failing to assist individuals to avoid an eternal hell. It is not fair to the non-Catholic mind to be reticent—or, worse, silent—on that fact when attempting to present Thomistic philosophy in social case work.

Finally, and in emphatic insistence, to represent man as the object of the solicitude of the social case worker without showing man's capacity for forming virtuous action, consistent, intransigent, prompt, contented, appreciated—that is to caricature Thomistic philosophy in social case work.

BAKEWELL MORRISON, S.J.

Saint Louis University

BARBARA CELARENT. By Thomas Gilby, O.P. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949. Pp. xiii + 303. \$4.00.

The subtitle, "A Description of Scholastic Dialectic," more or less adequately describes the book. It is an introduction to logic that is meant to be read, not to be taught. It is the kind of book you might give to a literary-minded friend who should desire to have a gentleman's acquaintance with Thomistic dialectic and procedure. A teacher of logic might find it very useful in his class preparation: it abounds in unusual and arresting examples, in witty turns of expression, in intricate literary allusions, in the rich experience of a vivid personality. The author indulges on asides on almost every conceivable subject. There is such an abundance of cleverness that some readers may find their taste sated after ten pages. Perhaps the book is best read in short sittings.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES. Vol. X, 1948. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1948. Pp. 297. \$5.00.

Fourteenth-century philosophy gets most of the attention of this volume. M. Etienne Gilson has a long (pp. 21-92) textual study of "L'Objet de la Métaphysique selon Duns Scot." M. Gilson searches the texts that deal with the limits of metaphysics, the relations between theology and metaphysics, and *ens commune*, to decide that the univocal being of Scotus has a metaphysical community of nature, characterized by an Avicennan indifference to all its actual or possible determinations.

Armand Maurer, C.S.B., writing on "Henry of Ghent and the Unity of Man," shows that he handles this problem in terms of the philosophy of Avicenna. J. Owens, C. SS. R., answers the question, Up to what point is God included in the metaphysics of Duns Scotus? by showing that God enters metaphysics under the most perfect concept naturally obtainable, that of infinite being. Theodore Silverstein presents "Daniel Morley, English Cosmogonist and Student of Arabic Science." Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., gives an introduction and the critical text of the first two books of William of Vaurouillon, O.F.M., *Liber de Anima*. The text of the third book is to appear in the next volume.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

- 1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
- 2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
- 3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ADAMS, HENRY. *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma*. New York: Peter Smith, 1949. Pp. 317. \$3.50.

Atomic Age, The. "Sir Halley Stewart Lectures." New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 149. \$2.50.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *The Confessions of Saint Augustine*. Translated by Edward B. Pusey, D.D. With an introduction by Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen. New York: Modern Lib., 1949. Pp. 352. \$1.25.

BARKER, ERNEST. *Political Thought in England, 1848-1914*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 240. \$2.00.

BARR, STRINGFELLOW. *The Pilgrimage of Western Man*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949. Pp. 382. \$4.00.

BELL, BERNARD IDDINGS. *Crisis in Education. A Challenge to American Complacency*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1949. Pp. 246. \$3.00.

BELLARMINE, ROBERT, CARDINAL. *Response to the Principal Points of Apology for Succession of Henry of Navarre to Kingdom of France*. (Paris, 1587). Translated by G. A. Moore. Washington: Country Dollar Press, 1949. Pp. 90. \$2.00.

BELLOT, DOM PAUL, O.S.B. *Propos d'un bâtisseur du bon Dieu*. Montréal: Fides, 1949. Pp. 128, and 16 rotogravures. Paper, \$1.75.

In a series of eight lectures, the eminent Benedictine architect presented his theory of art and architecture in 1934. The lecture notes, revised by the author himself, are here reprinted. He explains his theories of taste, of style, of beauty; he discusses the special characteristics of Christian art. The last four lectures deal with the relation between art and technique in architecture.

There is a preface by Henri-Paul Bergeron, C.S.C., and a brief biography by Henri Charlier. The plates present views of the churches and buildings designed by Dom Bellot.

BERGER, GASTON. "Existentialism and Literature in Action," *The University of Buffalo Studies*, 18 (1948), No. 4, December.

Gaston Berger, professor of philosophy at the University of Aix-Marseille, gave a series of lectures at the University of Buffalo on the intellectual problems of France. The two lectures here printed are the last of the series.

Professor Berger's comments on the relation between existentialism and the feelings of failure and despair, the need for permanent revolution, and the hatred of the bourgeois society characteristic of many French intellectuals, are very illuminating. The second lecture shows the universal human significance of this movement.

BERGSON, HENRI. *Selections*. Edited, with an introduction by Harold A. Larrabee. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; Aug., 1949. Pp. xix + 160. \$1.75.

This is the eighth in the very useful and remarkably low-priced "Philosophy Source Books." The short introduction displays Bergson and his place in the movement of modern thought. The selections are well chosen from the point of view both of the development of Bergson's thought and of the various topics on which he brilliantly dwelt.

BOOLE, GEORGE. *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 82. \$3.75.

This is the first reprint of the original essay published in England in 1847. It is an indispensable source for the history of logic and for the more recently developed symbolic logics.

BORN, MAX. *Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance*. "Waynflete Lectures." New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. \$4.50.

BOTERO, GIOVANNI. *Practical Politics (Ragion di Stato)*. RIBADENEYRA, PEDRO. *Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince, against Machiavelli*. Translated by George Albert Moore. Collector's edition, No. 64. Washington: Country Dollar Press, 1949. Pp. xxvii + 388.

This is the third in the "Moore Series of Source Books," which prints translations of sources important for the history of political and economic theory. Botero's work, in ten books, ranges from the ethical considerations of the nature of dominion, justice, and virtue to political economy and military strategy. There are two supplementary essays, one on "Neutrality," the other on "The Reputation of the Prince." Ribadeneyra's *Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince* is given in an abridged translation. It is a more practical and exhortatory work than the preceding.

The translations are intelligible, though not altogether free from awkward expressions. There is a whole page of errata. A detailed index is supplied.

BRIN, JOSEPH G. *Introduction to Functional Semantics*. Foreword by Maxwell H. Goldberg. Boston: National Press Corp. Pp. 201. Paper, \$3.00.

BRUNNER, HEINRICH EMIL. *Christianity and Civilisation*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1948. Pp. 183. \$2.50.

BUCKLEY, JOSEPH, S.M. *Man's Last End*. Foreword by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. xii + 249. \$3.50.

This is a consideration of the natural order and man's last end in that order. Father Buckley draws on the theories of Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., and the historical study of E. Elter, S.J., and contributes a large amount of historical information and doctrinal elaboration. Though he makes a distinction between the good to be possessed (objective last end, *finis cuius*) and its possession (subjective last end, *finis quo*), he considers the important distinction to be that between the metaphysical and the psychological last end. He concludes that the psychological last end is beatitude in general and that man has no determinate concrete last end in the natural order.

This means that the objective last end of man in the natural order would have been a collection of goods including God as the supreme good, subject to further specific determination by God's free choice.

The argument that God is not the last end of man's nature seems to proceed partly from the joint consideration of *finis cuius* and *finis quo* (e.g., p. 166) and partly from the distinction between the metaphysical and psychological orders, which distinction is sometimes pressed too far. Because of the infinity of intellect and will the distinction so insisted on seems to be one that is intended to be overcome.

CAVARNOS, CONSTANTINE. *A Dialogue between Bergson, Aristotle, and Philologos*. Cambridge, Mass.: published by the author (Belmont, Mass., 115 Gilbert Rd.), 1949. Pp. 60. Paper, 75¢

The author presents the perennial problems of change, knowledge, and the structure of reality in an interesting dramatic form. This work could readily be used as a reading in an introductory course in philosophy or as the kind of book to give a well-read friend who has little acquaintance with more technically written philosophical works.

COHEN, MORRIS R. *Studies in Philosophy and Science*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1949. Pp. 278. \$4.50.

COLERIDGE, SAMUEL TAYLOR. *Philosophical Lectures, 1818-1819*. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 480. \$7.50.

Though the Frere manuscript (a shorthand report of most of these lectures) has been known to exist, it has not hitherto been published. Miss Coburn explains the history of the manuscript and the other source material in a helpful introduction (which also treats the contents of the lectures) and uses the resources of a considerable literary skill in editing; she has also supplied many useful explanatory and historical notes.

The fourteen lectures on the history of philosophy begin with its origins in Greece and end with Kant and some remarks on the post-Kantians. Though Coleridge's information far surpasses that of his contemporaries, it is not this that a philosopher finds interesting in him. The genial insights and critical judgments are worth while, even though they are sometimes vitiated by lack of knowledge or understanding, sometimes warped by what seems to be a relativistic bias.

COMMAGER, HENRY STEELE, and OTHERS. *Years of the Modern*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949. Pp. 384. \$3.50.

COOK, ALBERT. *The Dark Voyage and the Golden Mean: A Philosophy of Comedy*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 225. \$3.50.

COOK, REGINALD LANSING. *Passage to Walden*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Pp. 254. \$3.00.

CORTNEY, PHILIP. *The Economic Munich. The I.T.O. Charter, Inflation or Liberty*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 282. \$3.75.

DASGUPTA, SURENDRANATH. *A History of Indian Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 496. \$13.50.

DAUGERT, STANLEY M. *The Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER HENRY. *Religion and Culture*. Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the year 1947. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948. Pp. 230. \$3.50.

DE BEAUVOIR, SIMONE. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 163. \$3.00.

DEFERRARI, ROY J., and BARRY, SISTER MARY INVIOLOATA, with the technical collaboration of JOSEPH IGNATIUS MCGUINNESS, O.P. *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Fascicle I, pp. x + 262; Fascicle II, pp. 263-495, 1948 and 1949. Paper, \$12.50 per fascicle.

Fascicles I and II of this dictionary of the language of St. Thomas cover the span A-C and D-H respectively. The work is planned for five fascicles. The basic text is the *Summa Theologiae*, whose language is defined and then illustrated from the *Summa* itself, and to some extent from other works.

DE JOUVENEL, BERTRAND. *On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth*. New York: Viking Press, 1949. Pp. 440. \$5.00.

DE MARQUETTE, JACQUES. *Introduction to Comparative Mysticism*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 229. \$3.75.

Philosophers (or at least many of them) have learned from the failures of others that any attempt at a synthesis of philosophical doctrines results in a loss of the insights of at least one, and frequently of all the doctrines thus put together. Comparative religion and comparative mysticism still give the illusion that by the discarding of differences a student can retain the "essential" elements of religion and mysticism. What seems to happen in fact is that the essential elements of each are gone and only accidental externals remain. The result is of course not intended by professors or students. Their intention is of the noblest, and their interest an encouraging sign. But books like this one can only serve to mislead the beginner and irritate the well-versed by the inadequacy of summary and comparison.

DENNIS, WAYNE (ed.). *Readings in General Psychology*. New York: Prentice-Hall. Pp. 536. \$5.00; text ed., \$3.75.

DESSAUER, F. E. *Stability*. New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1949. \$3.50.

DE VORE, NICHOLAS. *New Frontiers of Psychology*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 149. \$3.00.

DE VRIES, H. *How Analytic Geometry Became a Science*. New York: Scripta Mathematica, 1948. Pp. 15. Paper, 25¢

DIECKMANN, HERBERT. *Le Philosophe*. Saint Louis: Washington Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 117. \$3.00.

DILLARD, DUDLEY. *The Economics of John Maynard Keynes. The Theory of a Monetary Economy*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948. Pp. 379. \$5.00; text ed., \$3.75.

DUNNE, J. W. *An Experiment with Time*. 2d ed. revised. New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1949. \$3.50.

ELIOT, THOMAS STEARNS. *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949. Pp. 128. \$2.50.

EMMENEGGER, JOSEPH EUGENE. *The Functions of Faith and Reason in the Theology of Saint Hilary of Poitiers*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1948. Pp. 264. Paper, \$2.50.

Family in a Democratic Society, The. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; June, 1949. Pp. 300. \$4.00.

FILMER, SIR ROBERT. *Patriarcha, and other Political Works*. Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 326. \$2.75.

FLIESS, ROBERT (ed.). *The Psychoanalytic Reader*. New York: International Univ. Press, 1949. Vol. 1, pp. 392. \$7.50.

FLUGEL, J. C. *A Hundred Years of Psychology*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$4.00.

FRANK, PHILIPP. *Modern Science and Its Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; July, 1949. Pp. 300. \$4.50.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. Translated from the German by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1949. Pp. 127. \$2.00.

FROST, GEORGE EDWIN. *The Material and Spiritual Destiny of Man*. Portland: P. J. Nelson, 1948. Pp. 302. \$3.00.

GARDINER, HAROLD C., S.J. *The Great Books: A Christian Appraisal*. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1949. Pp. 128. \$2.00.

GEWIRTH, ALAN. *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949.

GIBRAN, KAHLIL. *Tears and Laughter*. Revised and enlarged edition. Translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited with a preface by Martin L. Wolf. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. [18 +] 127. \$2.75.

This collection of short poems and prose pieces is rather philosophical belles-lettres than philosophy. Yet philosophical reflection also has its place. The preface conveys a minimum of information; it seems rather intended to arouse interest and enthusiasm in the prospective reader.

GILL, ERIC. *It All Goes Together*. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1949. Pp. 236. \$3.50.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Being and Some Philosophers*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. Pp. xi + 219. \$3.50.

In this brilliant profound sequel to *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Professor Gilson turns to history for an answer to the questions, What is being? and How do we know being? He analyzes the movement of thought in the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Avicennan philosophical families, in Kierkegaard, and in St. Thomas Aquinas. The two chapters on St. Thomas, "Being and Existence" and "Knowledge and Existence," are destined to take a permanent place as top-flight examples of metaphysical writing. (To be reviewed.)

GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON. *Autobiography*. Translated by R. O. Moon. Washington: Public Affairs Press; June, 1949. Pp. xvi + 700. \$5.00.

Though this work has been translated into English before, it has remained comparatively unknown. The present translation is smooth and easy to read. There is a good index.

———. *Goethe: Wisdom and Experience*. Compiled by Ludwig Curtius. Translated and edited by Hermann Weigand. New York: Pantheon Books, 1949. Pp. 299. \$3.75.

GOODHART, ARTHUR LEHMAN. *English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 44. \$1.50.

GUERARD, ALBERT. *Education of a Humanist*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1949. Pp. 300. \$5.00.

HARTMAN, SYLVESTER, J. *Fundamentals of Logic*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. v + 271. \$3.50.

This is a textbook of logic for college. The order of matter presented is traditional; there is an extensive section on scientific method. Every point is illustrated with many examples and with exercises.

Harvard List of Books in Psychology, The. Edited by the psychologists in Harvard University. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Aug., 1949. Pp. 64. \$1.00.

HEATH, SIR THOMAS. *Mathematics in Aristotle*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 305. \$5.50.

HERRICK, CHARLES JUDSON. *George Ellett Coghill, Naturalist and Philosopher*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 291. \$5.00.

HIGGINS, THOMAS J., S.J. *Man as Man*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; May, 1949. Pp. xii + 607. \$3.75.

This is a textbook of college ethics. In its detailed completeness and solidity of treatment it comes close to the classic work of Father Cronin. It uses a combination of the problem and the thesis methods; each chapter has a bibliography of suggested readings. There is a detailed index. Unfortunately, the language of the book is very technical and frequently Latinized.

The publisher is to be congratulated for publishing such a large book for such a low price.

HILLENBRAND, MARTIN J. *Power and Morals*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1949. Pp. xiv + 217. \$3.25.

This study of the nature and relation of politics and ethics is particularly interesting because its author is an experienced and successful diplomat. In studying political theories, he discovered the traditional theory of natural law and found it to be the only satisfactory one. His restatement of it is enriched with concrete modern examples. (To be reviewed.)

HOBBS, THOMAS. *De Cive or The Citizen*. Edited with an introduction by Sterling P. Lamprecht. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. xxxi + 211. \$1.75.

The text is that of the edition of 1651. The spelling has been modernized, the punctuation somewhat modified, the use of italics lessened to conform with modern usage. Four chapters dealing with religious points have been omitted. The introduction is historical, analytic, and critical. There is a brief bibliography.

HOK, RUTH CARTER. *Edouard Estaunié, the Perplexed Positivist*. New York: King's Crown Press. Pp. 116. Paper, \$2.25.

Human Relations in Tomorrow's World. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; June, 1949. Pp. 380. \$4.50.

HUSSERL, EDMUND. *Edmund Husserl and His Logical Investigations*. 2d ed. Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers; April, 1949. \$3.00.

HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. and OTHERS. *Goethe and the Unity of Mankind Today*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Round Table. Pp. 17. Paper, 10¢

INGE, WILLIAM RALPH. *The End of an Age, and Other Essays*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 295. \$3.00.

JAMES, D. G. *The Life of Reason. Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949. Pp. 285. \$4.00.

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. *Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson*. Edited by Philip S. Foner. New York: Halcyon House. Pp. 834. \$2.95.

JEPSON, GLENN LOWELL and OTHERS. *Genetics, Paleontology, and Evolution*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 488. \$6.00.

JEPSON, R. W. *Clear Thinking*. 4th ed. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949. Pp. 256. \$1.30.

JESPERSEN, OTTO. *Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin*. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 448. \$4.50.

JOAD, CYRIL EDWIN MITCHINSON. *Decadence. A Philosophical Inquiry*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 430. \$4.75.

JOSEPH, H. W. B. *Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. 82. \$1.50.

———. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 198. \$3.75.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Müller. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 808. \$6.00.

KEITH, SIR ARTHUR. *A New Theory of Human Evolution*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 461. \$4.75.

KNEALE, WILLIAM. *Probability and Induction*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 272. \$4.25.

KUHN, HELMUT. *Encounter with Nothingness*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. Pp. xxii + 168. \$3.00.

This eleventh volume in "The Humanist Library" is an essay on existentialism. The author, professor of philosophy at Emory University, examines the meaning of existence in ordinary experience. Then he examines the experience of nothingness on which the existentialists base their philosophy. This is followed by an analysis of the existentialist positions on the subjectivity of truth, the uselessness of contemplative thought, freedom as

- absolute choice, crisis as a philosophical instrument. Throughout, the author tries to be both sympathetic and critical. (Reviewed in this issue.)
- LA MONTE, JOHN LIFE. *The World of the Middle Ages*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. 848. \$5.50.
- LEE, IRVING J. (ed.). *The Language of Wisdom and Folly*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1949. Pp. 383. \$4.00.
- Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, The*. Translated by Kurt Wilk, edited by Edwin W. Patterson. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1949. \$6.00.
- LEPLEY, RAY. *Symposium on Value*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; July, 1949. Pp. x + 508. \$6.00.
- LONIGAN, EDNA. *Expanding Welfare in a Free Economy*. New York: American Enterprise Assn., 1949. Pp. 42. Paper, 50¢
- MAIMONIDES. *The Code of Maimonides*. Translated by Jacob J. Rabinowitz. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 369. \$5.00.
- MAKRAKIS, APOSTOLOS; LIVADEAS, THEM. *Philosophical Discussions*. Chicago: Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1948. Pp. 39. Paper, 50¢
- MARCEL, GABRIEL. *The Philosophy of Existence*. Translated by Manya Harari. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. viii + 96. \$2.75.
- Of the three essays which make up the main part of this work, the first dates from 1933, the others from 1946; the fourth piece is a short autobiography dating from 1947. The first and third essays give the main lines of Marcel's own existentialism and some of its distinguishing characteristics. The second essay is an understanding, but nevertheless trenchant, critique of Sartre.
- MCCALLUM, JAMES RAMSAY. *Abelard's Christian Theology*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 124. \$2.25.
- MCGUIRE, PAUL. *There's Freedom for the Brave*. New York: Wm. Morrow & Co. \$4.00.
- MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER. *Inclinations and Obligations*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1948. Pp. 21. Paper, 50¢
- MERTON, EGON STEPHEN. *Science and Imagination in Sir Thomas Browne*. New York: King's Crown Press; May, 1949. Pp. ix + 160. \$2.50.
- MOUNIER, EMMANUEL. *Existentialist Philosophies*. Translated from the French by Eric Blow. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 149. \$3.00.
- MUNRO, THOMAS. *The Arts and Their Interrelations*. New York: Liberal Arts Press. Pp. 574. \$7.50.
- MURDOCK, KENNETH BALLARD. *Literature and Theology in Colonial New England*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 246. \$4.00.
- MURPHY, GARDNER. *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Pp. 480. \$6.00.
- NEILL, THOMAS P. *Makers of the Modern Mind*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; April, 1949. Pp. xi + 391. \$3.75.
- This book contains brief, popular studies of the thought, personality, and influence of Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Locke, Newton, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Darwin, Marx, and Freud. Though the author insists on the inner logic of thought, he leaves the impression that ideas and their influence are a matter of temperament and circumstance. The book is useful for the general reader who is looking for some of the sources of modern thought.
- NOCK, SAMUEL A. *English Literature as a Road to Wisdom*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 21. Paper, 25¢
- NORTHROP, F. S. C. (ed.). *Ideological Differences and World Order. Studies in the Philosophy and Science of the World's Cultures*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 497. \$4.50.
- PAP, ARTHUR M. *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$4.00.

- PASTORE, NICHOLAS. *The Nature-Nurture Controversy*. New York: King's Crown Press. Pp. 229. \$3.25.
- PEIRCE, CHARLES S. *Chance, Love, and Logic*. 2d ed. Edited with an introduction by Morris R. Cohen; with a supplementary essay on the pragmatism of Peirce by John Dewey. New York: Peter Smith, 1949. Pp. xxxiii + 318. \$4.50.
- This important work of Peirce's, first printed in 1923, has been completely out of print for a long time. One who has never had a chance to see this work might care to know that the first group of essays is called "Illustrations of the Logic of Science," and deals with the pragmatic method; the second, "Love and Chance," gives some of the leading general background ideas of Peirce.
- Political Theories of Bellarmine, Barclay, Suarez, Molina and Rothmann, The*. Translated by G. A. Moore. "The Moore Series of Source Books." Washington: Country Dollar Press, 1949-1950.
- PRATT, JAMES B. *Reason in the Art of Living*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$4.50.
- PRICE, RICHARD. *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*. Edited by D. Daiches Raphael. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 348. \$4.50.
- Prospect before Us, The. Some Thoughts on the Future*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 271. \$3.00.
- RAND, BENJAMIN. *Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology, and Cognate Subjects*. 3 vols. New York: Peter Smith, 1949. Pp. 1192 [2 vols.]. \$20.00.
- RAVEN, J. E. *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 204. \$2.75.
- Reflections on Our Age*. Lectures delivered at the opening session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne University, Paris. Introduction by David Hardman. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 346. \$4.50.
- RITCHIE, ARTHUR DAVID. *Essays in Philosophy*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948. Pp. 208. \$3.50.
- ROCKER, RUDOLF. *Pioneers of American Freedom. Origin of Liberal and Radical Thought in America*. Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1949. Pp. 235. \$3.00.
- ROSENTHAL, M. and YUDIN, P. *Handbook of Philosophy*. New York: International Publs., 1949. Pp. 128. \$2.00.
- ROSS, JULIAN L. *Philosophy in Literature*. Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press and Allegheny College, 1949. Pp. 297. \$3.00.
- SARMA, D. S. *The Gandhi Sutras*. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1949. \$2.50.
- SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. *What Is Literature?* Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 306. \$4.75.
- M. Sartre here presents his thesis that prose is essentially utilitarian and that the purpose a writer ought to have is social. In his violent attack upon the bourgeois mind, he admits that he "very much doubt[s] whether there is a bourgeoisie in the United States" (p. 162). This does not mean that he has either understanding of, or sympathy for, the United States; it is rather scorn; for example, pp. 161-62, 227-28, 243-44.
- SCHAPIRO, JACOB SALWYN. *Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism. Social Forces in England and France (1815-1870)*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Pp. 432. \$5.00.
- SCHWARTZMAN, JACK. *Rebels of Individualism*. New York: Exposition Press, 1949. Pp. 95. \$2.50.
- SCHWEITZER, ALBERT. *Goethe*. Translated by Charles R. Joy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1949. Pp. 116. \$2.50.
- . *Out of My Life and Thought*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1949. Pp. 350. \$3.50.

SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS. *The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus*. Revised text and translation by Evan Roche, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1949. Pp. xvii + 153.

This edition has been prepared from seven manuscripts, together with the critical edition of Mueller. The present edition differs from that of Mueller in a number of readings and in the identification of a number of references to Aristotle. While we are waiting for the Quaracchi editors to come out with the completely critical edition of all of Scotus's writings, we are glad to have such a carefully prepared text as this.

The translation intends to be close and literal. The translator recognizes that for this reason it may sometimes be obscure. In fact, it is sometimes necessary to have recourse to the Latin text to understand the translation.

Father Roche promises a commentary on this work.

SELLARS, ROY WOOD; MCGILL, V. J., and FARBER, MARVIN. *Philosophy for the Future*. New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1949. \$7.00.

SHIMER, WILLIAM ALLISON. *Conscious Clay. From Science via Philosophy to Religion*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1948. Pp. 211. \$2.50.

SOMERVILLE, JOHN. *The Philosophy of Peace*. New York: Gaer Associates, 1949. Pp. 264. \$3.00.

SPENCER, THEODORE. *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man*. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$3.75.

STEPHEN, LESLIE. *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*. 2 vols. 3d ed. New York: Peter Smith, 1949. Pp. 466 and 469. \$12.50.

SUZUKI, DAISETZ TEITARO. *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism*. With a foreword by C. G. Jung. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 136. \$3.75.

This is an attempt to present and explain Zen Buddhism, so far as a way of life that professes to have no doctrine and to be a sheer experience can be explained. Zen is said not to be a philosophy in the accents that are becoming familiar to us from the writings of certain existentialists. It can perhaps best be understood by a series of antitheses: it is experience, not thought; practice, not speculation; life, not learning; emotion, not knowledge, and so on. That these complementary activities of man should be conceived of as exclusive alternatives is perhaps due to the essentialist character of Indian Buddhism.

The foreword further confuses the issue, except in so far as it insists that Zen is not something for the dilettante.

SWEETZ, PAUL MARLOR. *Socialism*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Pp. 289. \$3.50.

TAYLOR, HENRY OSBORN. *The Medieval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1949. Vol. I, pp. xix + 603; Vol. II, pp. viii + 620. \$10.00.

THEOPHRASTUS VON HOHENHEIM [Paracelsus]. *Volumen Medicinæ Paramirum*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. 69. \$1.75.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *On Kingship to the King of Cyprus*. Translated by Gerald B. Phelan. Revised, with an introduction and notes by I. Th. Eschmann, O.P. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. Pp. xxxix + 119. Paper, \$1.50.

As the basis for this revised translation, Father Eschmann has gone to the medieval manuscripts and so given us the first authentic printed edition of this work. It is to be hoped that he will publish his Latin text; the present edition contains only the variants from the printed versions. The introduction shows that the work is a fragment and tries to give its probable date and circumstances of composition. It also analyzes the nature of the work and its contents. Copious historical and doctrinal notes are given. A second appendix contains selected parallel texts, also translated. There is a bibliography and an index.

———. *On Spiritual Creatures*. Translated with an introduction by Mary C. Fitzpatrick in collaboration with John J. Wellmuth, S.J. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 135. Paper, \$2.00.

This translation has been made from the critical edition of Father Leo Keeler, S.J. There is an introduction to the *Disputed Questions* in general and to this one in particular. All the references of St. Thomas are identified in the text; footnotes give parallel passages from St. Thomas himself, enlightening texts from Aristotle, Averroes, and the like, and short explanations and references. The translation seems to be quite accurate, and should prove to be easily intelligible even to students.

———. *Selected Political Writings*. Translated by J. C. Dawson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 235. \$2.25.

———. *Summa Theologica*, Vol. 3. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1948. Pp. 1604. \$48.00 set.

THOMSON, DAVID CLEGHORN. *Equality*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 165. \$1.25.

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. *Atomic Energy and the Life Sciences*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. 203. Paper, 45¢

Introductions and summaries of problems and research are very useful for those interested in the philosophy of nature, and in the philosophy of science and scientific method.

Upanishads. Katha, Isa, Kena, and Mundaka. Translated from the Sanskrit by Swami Nikhilananda. New York: Harper & Bros., 1949. Pp. 329. \$3.50.

URWICK, E. J. *The Values of Life*. Edited with an introductory essay by J. A. Irving. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1948. Pp. 244 + lxxv. \$3.50.

VILLASENOR, JOSE SANCHEZ, S.J. *Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist*. Translated by Joseph Small, S.J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; May, 1949. Pp. viii + 264. \$3.00.

This study of one of the influential modern thinkers falls into two parts: an exposition of Ortega's thought, and critical analysis and evaluation of it. The book is characterized by clarity and logical order—and more of the latter than existentialism itself would warrant. But there is also sympathetic understanding along with a wealth of information. The translation is smooth and idiomatic. There is a bibliography and an index.

WADLER, ARNOLD D. *One Language—Source of All Tongues*. New York: American Press for Art and Science, 1948. Pp. 308. \$7.50.

WAHL, JEAN. *A Short History of Existentialism*. Translated by Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 58. \$2.75.

This is a revision of a lecture delivered in 1946 and published by the author himself, together with a discussion of existentialism and M. Wahl's remarks on it by Berdiaeff, De Gandillac, Gurvitch, Koyré, Levinas, and Marcel. The lecture, together with the discussions, gives a clear picture and critique of Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre; Kierkegaard is presented with less understanding and sympathy.

WERKMEISTER, WILLIAM HENRY. *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1949. Pp. 615. \$5.00.

WEYL, HERMANN. *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science*. Revised and augmented English edition based on a translation by Olaf Helmer. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 311. \$5.00.

The basis for this book is the article "Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft," which appeared in R. Oldenbourg's *Handbuch der Philosophie* in 1926. Some alterations have been made in detail; the references have been brought up to date; and six new appendices are added: "The Structure of Mathematics," "Ars Combinatoria," "Quantum Physics and Causality," "Chemical Valence and the Hierarchy of Struc-

- tures," "Physics and Biology," "The Main Features of the Physical World," "Morphe and Evolution." There is an index. (To be reviewed.)
- WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP ELLIS. *A Critical Introduction to Ethics*. New York: Odyssey Press, 1949. Pp. 491. \$3.50.
- WHITTAKER, SIR EDMUND TAYLOR. *From Euclid to Eddington*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 221. \$4.00.
- WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON. *The Directive in History*. Boston: Beacon Press and Free Press. Pp. 158. \$2.00.
- WIENER, PHILIP P. *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 300. \$5.00.
- WINDEATT, MARY FABYAN. *St. Thomas Aquinas, Patron of Youth*. St. Meinrad, Ind.: The Grail Office. \$1.25.
- WOODWARD, ERNEST LLEWELLYN, and OTHERS. *Foundations for World Order*. Denver: Univ. of Denver Press. Pp. 174. \$3.00.
- WOODY, THOMAS. *Life and Education in Early Societies*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 825. \$7.50.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ARINTERO, JOHN G., O.P. *The Mystical Evolution in the Development and Vitality of the Church*. Translated by Jordan Aumann, O.P. Vol. I. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. xix + 358. \$4.50.
- ARMSTRONG, A. H. *The Real Meaning of Plotinus's Intelligible World*. "Aquinas Papers." Oxford: Blackfriars Publs., 1949. Pp. 11. 1s.
- BELLOT, DOM PAUL, O.S.B. *Propos d'un Bâtisseur du bon Dieu*. Montreal: Fides, 1949. Pp. 128 and 16 rotogravures. Paper, \$1.75.
- BERGER, GASTON. *Existentialism and Literature in Action*. University of Buffalo Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 4. Buffalo: Univ. of Buffalo, 1948. Pp. 157-86.
- BERGSON, HENRI. *Selections*. Edited with an introduction by Harold A. Larrabee. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. xix + 160. \$1.75.
- BOOLE, GEORGE. *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 82. \$3.75.
- BOTERO, GIOVANNI. *Practical Politics (Ragion di Stato)*. RIBADENEYRA, PEDRO. *Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince, against Machiavelli*. Translated by George Albert Moore. Chevy Chase, Md.: Country Dollar Press, 1949. Pp. xxvii + 388. \$5.00.
- BUCKLEY, JOSEPH., S.M. *Man's Last End*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. xii + 249. \$3.50.
- BURBANK, ADDISON, and SOUTHARD, ROBERT E., S.J. *The Life of Christ*. St. Paul: Catechetical Guild, 1949. Paper, 25¢
- CAVARNOS, CONSTANTINE. *A Dialogue between Bergson, Aristotle, and Philologos*. Cambridge, Mass.: Published by the author (Belmont, Mass., 115 Gilbert Rd.), 1949. Pp. 60. Paper, 75¢
- CERVANTES. *Don Quichotte*. Montreal: Fides, 1948. Pp. 150. \$1.50.
- COLERIDGE, SAMUEL TAYLOR. *Philosophical Lectures, 1818-1819*. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 480. \$7.50.
- COVENTRY, JOHN, S.J. *Morals and Independence*. London: Burns, Oates, 1949. Pp. 109. Paper, 4s. 6 d.
- DALMAU, JOSE M., S.J. *Suarez Teologo el Doctor Eximio*. Barcelona; Colegio Maximo de San Ignacio, 1949. Pp. 30.
- DEFERRARI, ROY J.; BARRY, SISTER MARY INVIOLOATA; and MCGUINNESS, JOSEPH IGNATIUS, O.P. *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Fascicles I (A - C) and II (D - H). Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1948, 1949. Fasc. I, pp. x + 262; Fasc. II, pp. 263-495. \$12.50 per fascicle.
- DE MARQUETTE, JACQUES. *Introduction to Comparative Mysticism*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 229. \$3.75.
- D'ORLEANS, JEAN. *Notre-Dame du cap. Messagère de Dieu*. Montreal: Fides, 1949. Pp. 206. \$1.25.
- DORONZO, EMMANUEL, O.M.I. *Tractatus Dogmaticus de Poenitentia*. Tom. I: *De Sacramento et Virtute*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1940. Pp. x + 517 + 33. \$7.50.
- DUBARLE, D., O.P. *Optimisme devant ce monde*. Paris: Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1949. Pp. 165.
- EKBERY, GEORGE E. *First Principles of Understanding*. "Aquinas Papers." Oxford: Blackfriars, 1949. Pp. 18. Paper, 1s. 6d.
- FABIAN, BELA. *Cardinal Mindszenty. The Story of a Modern Martyr*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1949. Pp. 207. \$2.75.